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1 
Carrots and Sticks, from President Obama’s 






The most prominent environmental issue of the 2012 presidential 
election may have been the Solyndra debacle, in which the Obama 
Administration lent more than $500 million to a solar energy company that 
later went bankrupt. Such financial “carrots” have been a centerpiece of 
President Obama’s environmental policy. This Essay uses the Solyndra 
story to expose the fatal flaws of a policy of carrots, including their 
inherent susceptibility, to politicization and the government’s inaccuracy in 
making “bets” in the private market. If the environmental community is 
serious about difficult legal steps, such as combating global warming, it 
should eschew the allure of carrots in favor more effective “sticks,” such as 
a cap-and-trade system, which President Obama in effect abandoned after 
his election, or a straightforward pollution tax. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
The Obama years have been a disappointment to many in the 
environmentalist legal community. On the most pressing issue—global 
climate change—President Barack Obama backed off almost completely 
from his pledge in 2008 to push for tight regulation of climate-changing 
greenhouse gasses.1 Instead, in an ironic contrast, the most prominent 
environmental issue of the 2012 presidential election was the so-called 
Solyndra scandal.2 Republican Mitt Romney skewered the Democratic 
President for federal financial aid to a solar panel company that in 2011 
dramatically went bankrupt—potentially costing the taxpayers hundreds of 
millions of dollars—and that seemingly made a mockery of President 
Obama’s signature pledge to create “green” jobs.3     
 Government intervention in markets, such as offering financial 
carrots to promising corporations, has been a guiding philosophy of the 
Obama Administration.4 This Essay highlights the fatal flaws of a system of 
awarding carrots, using as examples the Solyndra debacle and other 
vignettes, including electric cars and fuel ethanol. These stories illustrate 
that the failures of carrots can inflict long-term political harm on the 
environmental movement. The Essay then explains that a simple regulatory 
stick, such as a pollution tax, can avoid these pitfalls and realize real 
environmental benefits. The conclusion is that if lawmakers wish to take 
environmental protection seriously—as opposed to playing a short-term 
political game—they should eschew carrots in favor of sticks.            
    
                                                                                                                 
 1. See Cap and Trade, N.Y. TIMES TOPICS (Mar. 26, 2010), 
http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/subjects/g/greenhouse_gas_emissions
/cap_and_trade/index.html (summarizing the political developments since President 
Obama’s inauguration and the collapse of the Obama’s push for comprehensives national 
global climate change legislation) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, 
Climate, and the Environment); see also John M. Broder & Clifford Krauss, Advocates of 
Climate Bill Scale Down Their Goals, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2010), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/27/science/earth/27climate.html?scp=1&sq=lindsey%20gr
aham%20cap%20and%20trade%20broder&st=cse (explaining the weakening of Democratic 
support in Congress as an explanation for significant climate change legislation).  
 2. See John McArdle, GOP Aims to Taint Bluedog Dems with Solyndra Scandal, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2011), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/10/03/03greenwire-gop-aims-to-taint-bluedog-dems-
with-solyndra-s-35570.html?pagewanted=all (discussing the impact that the Solyndra 
scandal has had on the recent election). 
 3. See infra Part IV, notes 82–83, 113–135, and accompanying text.  
 4. See McArdle, supra note 2 (noting Solyndra as an example of a Democratic 
stimulus). 
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II.  The Disappearance of Climate Change in American Politics 
 
 Barack Obama’s election to the presidency in 2008 seemed to be an 
extraordinarily auspicious moment for the environmental law movement. 
Just two years after former Vice President Al Gore’s successful movie An 
Inconvenient Truth captured the public’s attention, the future President 
touted a legal plan to attack global climate change.5 Obama’s plan was to 
institute a national legal regime dubbed “cap-and-trade,” under which the 
total amount of greenhouse gases emitted in the United States would be 
restrained by a legal cap.6 Such a cap-and-trade system had been instituted 
internationally through the Montreal Protocol to reduce emissions of 
chlorofluorocarbons, which the United States had ratified and implemented 
under Presidents Ronald Reagan,7 and through the Kyoto Protocol,8 which 
the United States Senate had rejected in 1997.9 Under this cap-and-trade 
mechanism, polluters would be allowed to buy and trade the authority to 
pollute.10 A cap-and-trade system is the centerpiece of a new wave of 
thinking in environmental law that favors a more flexible, market-oriented 
approach to regulation, instead of the traditionally rigid system, chastised as 
“command and control,” under which polluters operate under precise and 
unyielding legal directives.11 The cap-and-trade idea had proven to be 
                                                                                                                 
 5.  See Andrew C. Revkin, Obama: Climate Plan Firm Amid Economic Woes, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 18, 2008), http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/11/18/obama-climate-
message-amid-economic-woes/ (discussing President Obama’s firm support for combatting 
climate change) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the 
Environment).  
 6.   See Cap and Trade, supra note 1 (summarizing the cap-and-trade idea, Obama’s 
2008 pledge, and the changing political atmosphere). 
 7.  See The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, available 
at http://www.epa.gov/ozone/intpol/ (creating a global cap for chlorfluorocarbons). 
 8.  See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, Dec. 11, 1997, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1997), 
[hereinafter Kyoto Protocol], available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf 
(creating a global cap for greenhouse gasses). 
 9.   See James Bennet, Warm Globe, Hot Politics, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 1997), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/1997/12/11/world/warm-globe-hot-politics.html 
(noting that the U.S. Senate in 1997 voted 95–0 to approve a resolution opposing any 
proposed treaty that did not impose emissions-cutting measures on developing nations); 
Kyoto Protocol, N.Y. TIMES TOPICS (Dec. 11, 2011), 
http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/subjects/k/kyoto_protocol/index.html 
(providing a brief history of the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, 
Climate, and the Environment). 
 10.   See Cap and Trade, supra note 1 (“It then allows utilities, manufacturers and other 
emitters to ‘trade’ pollution permits, or allowances, among themselves.”). 
 11.   See Robert N. Stavins, What Can We Learn From the Grand Policy Experiment? 
Lessons From SO2 Allowance, 12 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 69, 69–71 (1998) (explaining the 
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successful in its first major legal implementation domestically, the Sulfur 
Dioxide Trading Program set up by the 1990 Clean Air Amendments, 
which were enacted by a bipartisan Congress and signed into law by 
President George H. W. Bush.12     
 Four years after 2008, however, the “urgent” topic13 of climate 
change was almost extinguished as a national political issue in the United 
States.14 President Obama crushed the hopes of the environmental 
movement by effectively abandoning the issue.15 Notably, he left out any 
reference to the topic in his 2012 State of the Union message, and, even 
more remarkably, omitted it from his 2012 Earth Day address.16 His official 
campaign website listed “Energy and the Environment” as an issue, but its 
content referred primarily to ways of securing more energy, which 
President Obama calls an “all-of-the above” approach, including “investing 
in clean coal.”17 The White House website included a page for “Climate 
                                                                                                                 
switch in thinking from command-and-control to market-oriented regulation, such as a cap-
and-trade system); see also Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming 
Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1338 (1985) (criticizing the rigidity of 
command-and-control and arguing for a more flexible system that accounted for differences 
among regulated parties).   
 12.   Pub. L. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2584, title IV, §§ 401-416, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
7651-7651(o) (2012). 
 13.   See SIERRA CLUB, Energy Resources Policy 4, available at 
http://www.sierraclub.org/policy/conservation/energy.pdf (last visited Jan. 7, 2013) 
(“Stabilization of the global climate is an urgent matter requiring an immediate and effective 
response.”). 
 14.   See Bill Becker, On Climate Change, Nothing Ventured, Nothing Gained, 
THINKPROGRESS (Aug. 3, 2012), http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2012/08/03/629191/on-
climate-change-nothing-ventured-nothing-gained/?mobile=nc  (“Among political insiders in 
Washington, the conventional wisdom is that action on global climate change is a dead issue 
for the foreseeable future.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, 
Climate, and the Environment). 
 15.  See Cap and Trade, supra note 1 (summarizing the political developments since 
President Obama’s inauguration and the collapse of Obama’s push for comprehensive global 
climate change legislation); see also John M. Broder & Clifford Krauss, Advocates of 
Climate Bill Scale Down Their Goals, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2010), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/27/science/earth/27climate.html?scp=1&sq=lindsey%20gr
aham%20cap%20and%20trade%20broder&st=cse (explaining the attenuation of Democratic 
support in Congress for significant climate change legislation).  
 16.   See Joe Romm, President Obama Edits Out Climate Change From His Earth Day 
2012 Proclamation, THINKPROGRESS (Apr. 23, 2012), 
http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2012/04/23/469303/obama-edits-out-climate-change-from-
earth-day-2012-proclamation (noting that President Obama omitted a reference to climate 
change in his 2012 Earth Day Proclamation) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of 
Energy, Climate, and the Environment).  
 17.   OBAMA FOR AMERICA, President Obama’s Approach to Energy Independence, 
http://www.barackobama.com/energy-info/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2012) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
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Change,” but referred to no plan for combating greenhouse gas emissions, 
other than touting carrots of “clean energy investments.”18 Meanwhile, 
while the Environmental Protection Agency took limited steps to regulate 
greenhouse gases through auto emissions,19 the agency did not state any 
position in favor of broader legal action,20 such as tight regulation of 
                                                                                                                 
 18.   See WHITE HOUSE, Climate Change, http://www.whitehouse.gov/energy/climate-
change (last visited Aug. 17, 2012) (referring most prominently to the “milestone” of the 
Copenhagen Accord of 2009 of the U.N. Framework Convention of Climate Change) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
Environmentalists, by contrast, were not impressed by this document. See Jon M. Broder, 
Remember the Copenhagen Accord?, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2010), 
http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/08/remember-the-copenhagen-accord (referring to 
the “ill-defined goals” of the informal accord) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal 
of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). The White House page did not use the words 
“United Nations” in its discussion. President Obama’s most notable mention of climate 
change in 2012 was an interview with Rolling Stone magazine. Jann Wenner, Ready for the 
Fight: The Rolling Stone Interview with Barack Obama, ROLLING STONE (Apr. 12, 2012), 
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/ready-for-the-fight-rolling-stone-interview-with-
barack-obama-20120425 (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, 
and the Environment). Obama said:  “I suspect that over the next six months, [climate 
change] is going to be a debate that will become part of the campaign, and I will be very 
clear in voicing my belief that we’re going to have to take further steps to deal with climate 
change in a serious way.” Id. One environmental writer called the interview a break of 
Obama’s “self-imposed silence on climate change.” Joe Romm, Obama Stunner: Climate 
Change Will Be a Campaign Issue, We Need To Do Much More to Combat It, 
THINKPROGRESS (Apr. 25, 2012), 
http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2012/04/25/470940/obama-stunner-climate-change-will-be-
a-campaign-issue-we-need-to-do-much-more-to-combat-it (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). As for the comment that the issue 
might become important as the election approached, the writer opined: “I’ll believe it when I 
see it.” Id. 
 19.   See Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases 
under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY 74 Fed. Reg. 66496 
(Dec. 15, 2009), available at http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/endangerment/index.html 
(noting that the EPA finalized greenhouse gas emission standards for vehicles in 2010). 
These findings came in response to the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Massachusetts 
v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 525 (2007), which held that the EPA was compelled to make a finding 
about the role of auto emissions on climate change, by virtue of the Clean Air Act’s 
§ 202(a)(1). See 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2007) (providing the text of the Clean Air Act).  
 20.   See Is It Too Late To Do Anything About Climate Change? ENVTL. PROTECTION 
AGENCY (Apr. 17, 2012), http://climatechange.supportportal.com/ics/support/ 
kbanswer.asp?deptID=23006&task=knowledge&questionID=33355 (stating that “[w]ith 
appropriate actions by governments, communities, individuals, and businesses, we can 
reduce the amount of greenhouse gas pollution we release and lower the risk of much greater 
warming and severe consequences”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of 
Energy, Climate, and the Environment).  
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emissions from electrical power plants, which are the single largest source 
of climate-warming gases in the United States.21  
 Meanwhile, Republicans, including the 2012 presidential nominee 
Mitt Romney, ignored the issue. In his campaign website, Romney’s list of 
issues did not include the environment.22 His 160-page policy statement, 
entitled “Believe in America,” included one offhand, noncommittal 
reference to climate change (although it made many references to the 
“business climate”).23 The statement chastised President Obama for his 
now-abandoned cap-and-trade plan, stating that it “would have been a 
crippling blow to the U.S. economy” in which the “coal industry would 
have been hardest hit.”24 By contrast, Romney called for greater production 
of domestic energy sources, asserting that “[t]he United States is blessed 
with a cornucopia of carbon-based energy resources” and that “[c]oal is 
America’s most abundant energy source.”25 He said in 2011: “My view is 
that we don't know what's causing climate change on this planet. And the 
idea of spending trillions and trillions of dollars to try to reduce CO2 
emissions is not the right course for us.”26     
                                                                                                                 
 21.   See Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990–2010, ENVTL. 
PROTECTION AGENCY EPA 430-R-12-001, ES-4, ES-2 (2012), available at 
www.epa.gov/climatechange/Downloads/ghgemissions/US-GHG-Inventory-2012-Main-
Text.pdf (showing that electricity generation is the single larger producer to carbon dioxide 
emissions).  
 22.   See MITT ROMNEY, www.mittromney.com/issues (last visited Nov. 1, 2012) 
(omitting the environment as an issue on his campaign website) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
 23.   See Mitt Romney, Believe in America: Mitt Romney’s Plan for Jobs and Economic 
Growth 88 (Sept. 6, 2011), http://www.mittromney.com/blogs/mitts-view/2011/09/believe-
america-mitt-romneys-plan-jobs-and-economic-growth (projecting that Canadian oil 
reserves would be diverted to China) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of 
Energy, Climate, and the Environment). In a criticism of President Obama’s delay in 
approving the proposed Keystone XL pipeline, which would bring Canadian oil through the 
U.S. Midwest, Romney’s plan stated: “The apparent rationale for the Obama 
administration's policy—concern over global warming—is undercut by the fact that the 
Canadian oil sands will be developed regardless of what we do.” Id. at 88. This is the only 
reference to climate change in the policy document. Id. 
 24.   See id. at 88 (alleging that President Obama’s policies have effectuated a “war on 
the entire coal industry”). 
 25. See id. at 93 (advocating for an aggressive energy policy that prioritized domestic 
resources). His policy prescriptions, however, referred more often to oil and natural gas than 
to coal. Id. at 91–96. 
 26.   See Coral Davenport, Mitt Romney's Shifting Views on Climate Change, CBS 
NEWS (Oct. 28, 2011), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20127273-503544/mitt-
romneys-shifting-views-on-climate-change (documenting a change in Romney’s statements 
about the anthropogenic nature of global climate change as he was challenged by 
conservative Republicans during the presidential primaries) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).  
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 Romney did make a political issue, however, of one specific topic 
of environmental law: the Solyndra debacle. In 2012, he traveled to 
California—a rare visit to a “blue” state—and spoke before news cameras 
in front of the headquarters of the Solyndra Corporation in Fremont, on the 
east side of San Francisco Bay.27 There, the Republican candidate called the 
loan guarantees to the company an example of “crony capitalism” that 
helped only the friends and supporters of President Obama.28 Meanwhile, 
Romney’s campaign ran a television ad highlighting Solyndra.29 Over 
ominous sounding music and disturbing, flickering images, the ad 
concluded:  “More than 16 billion dollars have gone to companies like 
Solyndra that are linked to big Obama and Democrat donors . . . Obama is 
giving money to big donors and then watching them lose it. Good for them. 
Bad for us.”30 The YouTube publication of the ad states in the 
accompanying text: “This is just another example of President Obama's 
pattern of picking winners and losers and wasting taxpayer money.”31   
 At the Republican National Convention in August 2012, Romney’s 
running mate, Paul Ryan, uttered the only significant mention of 
environmental topics.32 In criticizing President Obama’s spending, Ryan 
asked rhetorically:   
What did the taxpayers get out of the Obama stimulus? 
More debt. That money wasn’t just spent and wasted—it 
was borrowed, spent, and wasted. It went to companies like 
Solyndra, with their gold-plated connections, subsidized 
jobs, and make-believe markets. The stimulus was a case of 
                                                                                                                 
 27. See Ben Sarlin, Romney Puts Solyndra At Center Of Campaign, Democrats Allege 
Hypocrisy, TALKING POINTS MEMO (May 21, 2012), 
http://2012.talkingpointsmemo.com/2012/05/romney-puts-solyndra-at-center-of-campaign-
democrats-allege-hypocrisy.php (alleging that Solyndra was a particularly good example of 
a failed alternative energy subsidy) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, 
Climate, and the Environment).  
 28. See Mitt Romney, Speech in Fremont, Cal. (May 1, 2012), 
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/05/mitt-romney-visits-solyndra-amid-attack-on-
obama-jobs-record (characterizing the administration’s energy policy as corrupt) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).  
 29. See Romney for President, Inc., Not Even Half, YOUTUBE (May 29, 2012), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=OQUyS9H6ioI (alleging 
further that these tax incentives were “steered to family and friends”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).  
 30. See id. (relying upon an unfortunately common political ad strategy of drumming 
up fear and hostility among the electorate).  
 31. See id. (extending the argument that the administration is squandering American 
tax dollars). 
 32. See generally Committee on Arrangements for the 2012 Republican National 
Convention, Convention Overview, available at http://www.gopconvention2012.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/08/Convention-Backgrounder-FINAL.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2012). 
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political patronage, corporate welfare, and cronyism at 
their worst. You, the working men and women of this 
country, were cut out of the deal.33  
It is a fair characterization to say that the Solyndra debacle, more than 
global warming or any other issue, was the most prominent topic of 
environmental policy during the 2012 presidential campaign—a remarkable 
turnabout from 2008. 
 Meanwhile, the overwhelming evidence of global climate change 
became even more convincing since 2008. President Obama was elected 
just a year after the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change concluded 
that “[m]ost of the observed increase in global average temperatures since 
the mid-20th century is very likely due to the observed increase in 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations.”34 Among the most worrying 
of the disturbances attributable to climate change are likely to be 
extraordinary disruptions of food supplies in poorer nations that do not have 
the money to adapt, along with devastating effects on animals and 
ecosystems.35    
 Since then, scientists have monitored whether the planet’s climate 
has reached a “tipping point” of enormous changes, such as a disruption of 
the annual Indian Ocean monsoon, relied upon by hundreds of millions of 
persons for their livelihood.36 An IPCC interim report in 2011 warned of the 
increased likelihood of “unprecedented extreme weather” attributable to the 
rapidly changing climate.37 Meanwhile, 2012 was the hottest year ever 
                                                                                                                 
 33. See Glenn Kessler, Fact Checking the GOP Convention’s Second Night, WASH. 
POST (Aug. 31, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/post/fact-
checking-the-gop-conventions-second-night/2012/08/30/128cbe9e-f260-11e1-adc6-
87dfa8eff430_blog.html (evaluating the accuracy of the convention speeches) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
 34. See Lenny Bernstein et al., Summary for Policymakers: Climate Change 2007, 
Synthesis Report, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 5–6 (Nov. 7, 2012), 
available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_spm.pdf (explaining 
the increased strength of the scientific conclusion that the increase in temperatures was due 
to the increase in anthropogenic emissions). 
 35. See id. at 9–14 (summarizing the adverse effects).  
 36. See Fred Guterel, Searching for Clues to Calamity, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2012), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/21/opinion/the-climate-change-tipping-
point.html?ref=globalwarming (examining data in an effort to forecast and prevent 
widespread catastrophe stemming from a climate related event). 
 37. See Simon K. Allen et al., Summary for Policymakers: Managing the Risks of 
Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation, 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 5 (2011), available at http://www.ipcc-
wg2.gov/SREX/images/uploads/SREX-SPMbrochure_FINAL.pdf (outlining the connection 
between climate change and extreme weather events). 
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recorded in the contiguous United States.38 That summer, scientists reported 
that arctic ice sheet had shrunk to its smallest size ever recorded.39 Also that 
summer, a group of Harvard scientists published a paper that for the first 
time linked a warming climate with more rainstorms to a thinning of the 
ozone layer in the stratosphere, which protects humans from harmful 
ultraviolet rays.40 Meanwhile, one of the most prominent skeptics of the 
anthropogenic nature of global warming, Berkeley’s Richard Muller, 
announced that he had joined the consensus of scientists who say that 
humans are the primary cause of the rapidly changing climate.41          
 What happened? How did it come to pass that, four years after the 
American public elected a president who was dedicated to firm legal action 
on climate change, the issue in effect disappeared from the public 
discourse, even while the climate news worsened? And how did “Solyndra” 
became the most prominent word in the public debate over environmental 
law? This Essay explores the answers to these perplexing questions.   
 One obvious part of the answer is the economic crisis that has 
gripped the United States and much of the world since 2008.42 It is 
axiomatic that wealthy nations feel rich enough to tackle expensive fixes to 
long-term problems, while relatively poorer cultures feel that they cannot 
                                                                                                                 
 38. Justin Gillis, Not Even Close: 2012 Was Hottest Ever in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 8, 
2013), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/09/science/earth/2012-was-hottest-
year-ever-in-us.html?_r=0.  
 39. Justin Gillis, Satellites Show Sea Ice in Arctic Is at a Record Low, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 27, 2012, at A4 (noting the dramatic melting of Greenland’s ice sheet which, due to its 
location above sea level, causes the sea level to rise more quickly than the melting of the 
floating arctic ice sheet); see also Kelly Slivka, Rare Burst of Melting Seen in Greenland’s 
Ice Sheet, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2012, at A4 (reporting on the same phenomenon). 
 40. See James G. Anderson, UV Dosage Levels in Summer: Increased Risk of Ozone 
Loss from Convectively Injected Water Vapor, 17 SCIENCE 808–10 (July 2012) 
(documenting a snowball effect between increased heat and increased humidity leading to 
ozone reduction).  
 41. See Neela Banerjee, Koch-Funded Climate Change Skeptic Reverses Course, L.A. 
TIMES (July 29, 2012), available at http://www.latimes.com/news/politics/la-pn-kochfunded-
climate-change-skeptic-reverses-course-20120729,0,7372823.story (detailing a scientist’s 
shifting opinion from climate skeptic to believer). Koch’s Berkeley Earth Surface 
Temperature project was funded in part by the Charles Koch Charitable Foundation, which 
supports many libertarian and anti-government projects. Id. Mueller’s conclusion came two 
years after the most publicly prominent critic of laws to combat climate change, Bjørn 
Lomborg (who had argued that the money spent would not be worth it), appeared to change 
his position and support tougher legal steps. See Juliette Jowit, Bjørn Lomborg: The 
Dissenting Climate Change Voice Who Changed His Tune, GUARDIAN, Aug. 30, 2010, at 6 
(explaining the nuances in Lomborg’s positions and his changed comments over time). 
 42. See Recession, N.Y. TIMES TOPICS, 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/r/recession_and_depression/ind
ex.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2012), (discussing the recession that began in 2008) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
10 4 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY, CLIMATE, & ENV’T 1 (2013) 
afford to do so. The first age of environmentalism, along with many of the 
leading federal statutes, was the affluent era of the 1960s and early 1970s.43 
During the consumer-led boom of the first years of the 21st century, the 
nation was open to a discussion of short-term costs to the economy of 
penalizing greenhouse gas emissions. But from 2008, a gloomy economic 
recession sent the unemployment rate above eight percent for more than 
four years.44 The sour economy was the dominant political issue throughout 
President Barack Obama’s first term in office. This was not an auspicious 
time to convince the American people that they would have to suffer the 
pains of higher energy prices and economic dislocation caused by 
significant greenhouse gas regulation, even in the short run. Although 
President Obama had pledged to foster cap-and-trade legislation, he made 
little effort to push it through Congress during this first term.45 Republicans 
also contributed to the death of climate change legislation.46 They cannily 
ran a marketing campaign in 2009 and 2010 to refer to the cap-and-trade 
idea as “cap and tax,” thus insinuating into the debate the word “tax” that is 
so distasteful to American voters.47               
Another reason for the failed promise is attributable to the 
professional character of President Barack Obama. To generalize, liberal 
politicians can be divided into two groups—social welfare liberals and 
environmental liberals.48 The two may overlap, of course, but the former 
                                                                                                                 
 43. See RICHARD J. LAZARUS, MAKING ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 47–97 (2002) 
(discussing the climate of prosperity and optimism in the 1960s and early 1970s). Among 
the federal statutes were the Wilderness Act of 1964, the National Environmental Policy Act 
of 1969, the Clean Air Act of 1970, the Clean Water Act of 1972, and the Endangered 
Species Act of 1973. See id. at 50, 70 (describing an emerging emphasis on conservation by 
way of environmental legislation).  
 44. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Unemployment Rate, 
http://data.bls.gov/pdq/SurveyOutputServlet [search for 2000–12] (last visited Aug. 23, 
2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the 
Environment). The unemployment rate topped 8 % in February 2009 for the first time this 
century (compared to below 4 % at times in 2000) and remained over 8 % through August 
2012. Id.  
 45. See Cap and Trade, supra note 1, at 1 (summarizing the decline of the legislative 
idea, from the passage of a limited cap-and-trade bill in the House of Representatives in 
2009 to its “languishing” in the Senate with little support from President Obama). 
 46. See Evan Lehmann, How Republicans Managed to Rebrand ‘Cap and Trade’, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2010), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2010/09/30/30climatewire-how-republicans-managed-to-
rebrand-cap-and-t-95204.html?pagewanted=all (describing the Republicans’ efforts to attack 
“cap and trade” policy as economically harmful).  
 47. See id. (explaining the Republicans’ success in re-branding the phrase “cap and 
trade” as “cap and tax”). 
 48. See What is Social Liberalism?, SOCIALLIBERAL.NET (Feb. 12, 2009), 
http://socialliberal.net/2009/02/12/what-is-social-liberalism/ (discussing the tenets of social 
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are worried most about the day-to-day concerns of the American people, 
especially disadvantaged persons, while the latter focus on stresses to 
ecosystems and resources.49 Of all the American presidents, only Theodore 
Roosevelt, in the early days of “conservationist” thinking, appeared to place 
environmentalism at the forefront of his thinking.50 By contrast, the two 
most recent Democratic presidents—Bill Clinton and Barack Obama—were 
social welfare liberals.51 Although both went to law school during the era of 
environmentalism,52 there is no indication that either of them took a course 
in environmental law. Their careers before seeking elected office were 
those of social welfare advocates—Clinton taught constitutional law and 
then quickly went into politics, where he was famous for his ability 
empathize with people of modest backgrounds;53 Obama worked as a 
community organizer for poor neighborhoods in the south side of Chicago 
and worked in civil rights and community law for a small law firm before 
election to the state legislature.54 As politicians, both represented low-
                                                                                                                 
liberalism) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the 
Environment).  
 49. The former is the older and more prominent strand of thinking, stretching back to 
Franklin Roosevelt and, perhaps, to William Jennings Bryan, Abraham Lincoln, and Thomas 
Jefferson.  
 50. See Theodore Roosevelt and Conservation, NAT’L PARK SERV., 
http://www.nps.gov/thro/historyculture/theodore-roosevelt-and-conservation.htm (last 
visited Jan. 7, 2013) (calling Roosevelt “our country’s ‘Conservationist President’”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). Roosevelt, 
who advocated a “vigorous” lifestyle, including outdoor activity, presided over a great 
expansion of the national park system and signed into law both the Antiquities Act of 1906, 
Pub .L. 59-209, 34 Stat. 225, codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 431–43, which gives the president the 
power to set aside public lands as national monuments, and the Transfer Act of 1905, 33 
Stat. 628, codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 472, 524, 554, which established the National Forest 
Service. 
 51. See Mark Landler, A Vindication, With a Legacy Still Unwritten, N.Y. TIMES (June 
28, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/29/us/health-care-ruling-may-secure-obamas-
place-in-history.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (explaining the social welfare accomplishments 
and legacy of Presidents Barack Obama and Bill Clinton) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
 52. See Peter Dykstra, History of Environmental Movement Full of Twists, Turns, CNN 
(Dec. 15, 2008), 
http://www.cnn.com/2008/TECH/science/12/10/history.environmental.movement/index.htm
l (detailing an overview of the environmental movement in the United States) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
 53. See Julian Zelizer, Bill Clinton’s Lesson for Obama, CNN (Dec. 19, 2011), 
http://www.cnn.com/2011/12/19/opinion/zelizer-bill-clinton/index.html (“President Clinton 
displayed a phenomenal ability to show empathy with Americans who were suffering. . .”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).  
 54. See David Maraniss, Barack Obama: The Story, BIOGRAPHY.COM (2011), 
http://www.biography.com/people/barack-obama-12782369 (discussing Obama’s pre-
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income jurisdictions in which environmental issues, especially global 
topics, seemed of less pressing priority than day-to-day household 
struggles.55 While both mouthed the liberal line on environmental issues, it 
is fair to assert that Obama, like Clinton before him, did not have his heart 
in environmentalism the way that he did in social justice issues.56 This lack 
of commitment made Obama susceptible to policy choices that were 
politically appealing, but environmentally feeble, as illustrated by the 
Solyndra story.             
 Barack Obama entered the White House in 2009 at a time of 
economic storms, but also with great “political capital,” having been elected 
as the first African American president, by a sizeable majority of the 
nation’s vote, and under banners of “hope” and “change.”57 This short-term 
                                                                                                                 
political employment) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and 
the Environment).  
 55. In the 1980s, the “environmental justice” movement linked environmental law and 
low-income communities. The most notable first work was ROBERT BULLARD, DUMPING IN 
DIXIE (1990), which explained that polluters often preferred to locate environmental harms 
near poor communities, often black, in the South, in part because these communities were 
perceived to have little political clout to stop them. See ROBERT BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE 
97 (1990). Some mainstream environmentalists later apologized for focusing too much on 
national and global issues in environmental law, and not enough on local issues. See, e.g., 
DAVID SCHOENBROD, SAVING OUR ENVIRONMENT FROM WASHINGTON 149–54 (2005) (noting 
the mea culpa of Clinton’s EPA administrator Carol Browner). In 1994, President Clinton 
signed an executive order that instructed all federal agencies to make environmental justice 
part of their missions. See Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994), 
available at http://epa.gov/compliance/ej/resources/policy/exec_order_12898.pdf (setting 
out responsibilities and strategies for enacting a program of environmental justice for 
minorities). While the movement focused environmentalists’ attention on things such as 
noise and soot from factories on nearby low-income neighborhoods and galvanized some 
low-income communities to fight against such harms, the movement lost steam in the early 
21st century. See SCHOENBROD, supra note 55, at 153–54 (discussing the developments).  
 56. See Cat Lazaroff, Sun Sets on President Clinton’s Environmental Legacy, ENS-
NEWSWIRE (Jan. 19, 2001), http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/jan2001/2001-01-19-06.asp 
(assessing Clinton’s environmental legacy as “mixed,” though “clearly pro-environment”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
While Clinton took some small steps that pleased environmentalists, such as the orders that 
created the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument in Utah, he did not foster any 
new major environmental legislation during his eight years in office. See id. (explaining 
Clinton’s support for important but relatively minor environmental initiatives). Indeed, 
disaffection among environmentalists in Florida have been cited as a reason for the strong 
showing of Ralph Nader in the state during the 2000 presidential election, which was 
famously lost by the environmentally oriented Al Gore, Clinton’s vice president, by a razor-
thin margin. See id. (describing Nader as the “spoiler” who cost Gore the election).  
 57. See Barack Obama, N.Y. TIMES TOPICS (Sept. 7, 2012), 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/ 
o/barack_obama/index.html (referring to President Obama’s campaign messages of hope and 
change) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the 
Environment).  
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political capital allowed him, in effect, to prevail in Congress on one great 
legislative accomplishment. The two most prominent legislative issues at 
hand in 2009 were greenhouse gas regulation and health care reform. 
Pushing either of these highly complex, expensive, and controversial 
measures through Congress would have been difficult; to accomplish both 
in a time of economic recession would have been nearly impossible. His 
political capital allowed him to pursue only one.58 The choice was no 
contest. Although his chief of staff, Rahm Emanuel, reportedly begged the 
President not to push a comprehensive health care act because of the 
political risks of doing so,59 the social welfare liberal in President Obama 
saw an opportunity to achieve what liberals had dreamed of for more than a 
century60—a national system of heath care that gives insurance guarantees 
to nearly all Americans.61 In comparison, greenhouse gas regulation was 
not nearly as attractive to a social welfare liberal. By the time that the epic 
struggle for health care reform in Congress was accomplished, in early 
2010,62 President Obama’s political capital was spent, the nation was mired 
deep in economic doldrums, and there was no stomach for another daunting 
battle. The lost opportunity to enact a legal regime to discourage 
greenhouse gas emissions—a regulatory stick—was a crushing blow to 
environmentalism. To President Obama’s policymakers, however, all did 
not seem lost, because there remained the siren song of carrots for green 
energy. Here the story turns.                       
                                                                                                                 
 58. See id. (“But Senate Republicans blocked many other items on the president’s 
agenda, most notably a ‘cap and trade’ energy bill, meant to reduce the growth of carbon 
emissions.”). 
 59. See Greg Sargent, Book: Rahm "begged" Obama for days not to pursue ambitious 
health reform, WASH. POST (May 14, 2010), available at 
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/plum-
line/2010/05/book_rahm_spent_week_aggressiv.html (citing JONATHAN ALTER, THE 
PROMISE (2012)).  
 60. See A Brief History: Universal Health Care Efforts in the US, PHYSICIANS FOR A 
NAT’L HEALTH PROGRAM (1999), http://www.pnhp.org/facts/a-brief-history-universal-
health-care-efforts-in-the-us (outlining the history of the push for a national health system, 
stretching back to early 20th century and including efforts by both Theodore Roosevelt and 
Franklin Roosevelt) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and 
the Environment). 
 61. The legislation, tendentiously referred to by critics as “Obamacare,” was the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). The U.S. 
Supreme Court upheld the law, including the mandate that Americans purchase health 
insurance. Nat’l Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 
(2012). 
 62. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Robert Pear, Obama Signs Health Care Overhaul Bill, 
With a Flourish, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2010), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/24/health/policy/24health.html (describing the ceremony 
of President Obama’s signing of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act). 
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III.  Carrots and Sticks in Regulatory Policy 
 
 Regulation of markets may be divided into two categories: carrots 
and sticks. Whereas a stick discourages unwanted conduct by penalizing it, 
a carrot encourages preferred conduct by awarding it.63 In governmental 
financial terms, a tax is a stick, while a subsidy is a carrot.64 Government 
sometimes does both simultaneously: Consider the policy of encouraging 
the consumption of healthy beverages, in which the government taxes 
alcohol and debates banning the sale of big sodas (each a kind of stick),65 
while at the same time subsidizing the production of purportedly healthy 
milk (a carrot).66  
 As a matter of politics, however, awarding carrots may be far more 
appealing than applying sticks. Legislative theorists point out that 
legislative bills that offer concentrated benefits (such as a sizeable milk 
subsidy, paid to a limited number of milk producers) and distributed costs 
(the small amount of taxes paid by each citizen to pay for the milk subsidy) 
are more likely to be adopted than other types of bills.67 Such a bill 
energizes lobbying by the handful of persons who would receive the carrot, 
while the larger number of taxpayers is not motivated to oppose with any 
fervor the very small cost to each of them.68 Moreover, awarding carrots 
presents to the public a cheery side of regulation—government prominently 
awarding socially desirable conduct—while concealing the indirect cost to 
the budget. Thus, politicians have always famously enjoyed publicizing 
                                                                                                                 
 63. See generally IAN AYRES, CARROTS AND STICKS (2010) (discussing the use of 
incentives and disincentives). 
 64. See id. at 24–37 (describing the use of rewards and penalties in encouraging 
desired conduct). 
 65. In the summer of 2012, New York City debated banning the sale of large sodas 
because of a perceived link to obesity. See Michael M. Grynbaum, Strong Words From Both 
Sides at Soda Ban Hearing, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2012), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/25/nyregion/at-hearing-on-soda-ban-strong-words-both-
sides.html (discussing the hearing regarding New York’s proposal to restrict sales of sodas).  
 66. See Dairy Policy, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. (Aug. 23, 2012), 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/animal-products/dairy/ policy.aspx (explaining milk price 
support system) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the 
Environment).  
 67. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, PHILIP FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, 
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY, 54–59 (4th ed. 2007) (setting 
forth a model of concentrated benefits and distributed costs) (citing JAMES WILSON, 
POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS 316–21 (1973) (arguing that special interest groups sway 
politicians)); Theodore Lowi, American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political 
Theory, 16 WORLD POL. 677, 688 (1964) (highlighting the prominence of interest groups). 
 68. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, PHILIP FRICKEY, & ELIZABETH GARRETT, supra note 67, 
at 54–59 (explaining the effects of distributed and concentrated benefits and costs). 
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putatively “positive” carrots, such as cutting ribbons for new government 
projects, rather than enforcing with sticks.69   
 Political scientists have also recognized that politicians appeal to 
voters through policies that appear to generate employment.70 At the state 
and local level, governors and mayors use various carrots, including tax 
breaks, to lure businesses to their jurisdiction.71 Whether these subsidies 
truly increase long-term employment is not, of course, as important 
politically as the short-term perception among voters that the politician is 
doing something to help the local economy.72 This explains, in part, the 
popularity of governmental payments for stadiums that attract sports teams, 
despite evidence that such expenditure usually does not improve the local 
economy. The act of awarding the carrot itself is a charismatic political 
move.73 At the federal level, the dominant issue of the presidential election 
of 2012 was employment. While Romney argued that his free-market 
policies would “create jobs,”74 President Obama asserted that federal 
investment in clean energy would generate new employment.75 
 Carrots are politically more popular than sticks. But carrots, as this 
essay illustrates, have inherent drawbacks. At the outset, it is important to 
clarify that carrots are not merely the flip side of sticks, at least in 
environmental regulation. Consider the dilemma of greenhouse gases: 
While it is a relatively straightforward matter to impose a stick (through a 
                                                                                                                 
 69.   See VITO TANZI & HAMID DAVVODI, ROADS TO NOWHERE: HOW CORRUPTION IN 
PUBLIC INVESTMENT HURTS GROWTH 1 (1998), available at 
http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=KikOvxJp5NkC&oi=fnd&pg=PP4&dq=polit
icians+cutting+ribbons&ots=BLPKzQ6xcW&sig=RlOOJwSRL2eJFMXSx4E97M3mkWk#. 
 70. See, e.g., PAUL KANTOR, THE DEPENDENT CITY REVISITED 113–19 (1995) 
(discussing how governments compete to attract businesses). 
 71. See id. (discussing the incentives to local government). 
 72.  Robert Higgs, Cumulating Policy Consequences, Frightened Overreactions, and 
the Current Surge of Government's Size, Scope, and Power, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
531, 537 (2010) (arguing that government intervention in the economy falsifies market 
signals by supporting otherwise unsustainable businesses). 
 73.   See generally John Siegfried & Andrew Zimbalist, The Economics of Sports 
Facilities and Their Communities, 14 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 95 (2000) (scrutinizing the 
economic arguments for sports stadia).  
 74.   See, e.g., Brian Lambert, Romney, Promising 3 Million Jobs and $1 Trillion in 
New Revenue, Stops Here, MINNPOST (Aug. 23, 2012), 
http://www.minnpost.com/glean/2012/08/romney-promising-3-million-jobs-and-1-trillion-
new-revenue-stops-here (explaining Governor Romney’s promise of millions of new jobs) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
 75.   See, e.g., Zach Coleman, Obama Hypes Clean Energy in Iowa, Colorado Radio 
Ads, THE HILL (Aug. 20, 2012), http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-wire/244439-obama-
hypes-clean-energy-in-iowa-colorado-radio-ads (discussing ads that tout employment 
creation through federal investment in clean energy) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).  
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tax or cap) on the emission of such pollution,76 it would be a far more 
complex task to award a carrot (a subsidy) to all the alternative sources of 
energy, including solar, wind, hydroelectric, geothermal, nuclear, hydrogen 
cells, waves, etc. In addition, it would be prohibitively expensive for 
government to subsidize all alternative energy sources; this dilemma recalls 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ famous comment that “government could 
hardly go on” if it were try to compensate all parties subject to government 
regulation.77 Accordingly, when awarding carrots, the government tends to 
pick one or a handful of “winning” private actors, as shown by the Solyndra 
story.78  
 Moreover, it would be wrong to assert that the handing out of 
carrots is a harmless exercise in political marketing, similar to an elected 
official’s kissing babies or cutting a ribbon to open a new shopping center. 
The Solyndra story, to which the Essay now turns, reveals the inherent and 
profound flaws in carrots that make them a dead end in the environmental 
policy debate.79 
 
IV.  Solyndra and Obama’s Carrots 
 
 The Obama Administration’s award of carrots to the Solyndra 
Corporation was intended to make the California solar panel manufacturer 
the “poster child” for the Administration’s support of clean energy.80 The 
extraordinary irony of this decision is that, by 2012, the story had become 
an albatross around the necks of both the Obama Administration and the 
environmental movement.81  
 The fact that the Solyndra debacle arose during the Obama 
Administration is not surprising. President Obama’s environmental policy 
                                                                                                                 
 76.   The stick would be imposed on all emitters of greenhouse gases or, alternatively, 
all emitters of the most common greenhouse gas, carbon dioxide. The decision to regulate 
only carbon dioxide, and not less common greenhouses gases, such as methane, admittedly 
is a policy choice that makes the stick option less than perfect. 
 77.   See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (“Government hardly could 
go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying 
for every such change in the general law.”).  
 78.  See generally MAJ. STAFF REPT. FOR H.R. COMM. ON ENERGY & COMMERCE, 112TH 
CONG., THE SOLYNDRA FAILURE, at Parts IIIX (Aug. 2, 2012), available at 
http://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/files/analysi
s/20120802solyndra.pdf [hereinafter House Republican Report] (presenting a detailed 
account of the federal loan and subsequent failure of Solyndra). 
 79.   This Essay’s telling of the Solyndra story does not purport to explain every detail, 
of course, but rather highlights the flaws of a policy of carrots. 
 80.   House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 9 (explaining that the Administration 
tied itself closely to the project to highlight Obama’s signature economic policy). 
 81.  See, e.g., Sarlin, supra note 27 (explaining how the Solyndra affair has been used 
against President Obama politically). 
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has been marked by an effort to “invest in a clean energy future”82 and 
“build the foundation for a clean energy economy,” as touted by the 
Administration.83 This strategy is consistent with modern political 
liberalism, which highlights the failures of the private market to achieve 
desirable social ends.84 Most significantly, government intervention is 
justified when the market produces externalities—meaning harmful effects 
that are not reflected in the market transactions.85 Pollution is the classic 
example.86 
 This is not to say that carrots are awarded only by Democrats. As 
noted above, there may be gain for any politician in handing out carrots. 
Indeed, the seed of the Solyndra debacle arose during the presidency of 
George W. Bush, who signed the Energy Policy Act of 2005.87 The 
preamble asserted that the Act would “ensure jobs for our future with 
secure, affordable, and reliable energy.”88 One title authorized “incentives 
for innovative technologies.”89 It broadly authorized the Secretary of 
Energy to make loan guarantees to “projects” that combated greenhouse gas 
emissions and that employed “new or significantly improved 
                                                                                                                 
 82. The White House, President Barack Obama, Energy, Climate Change and Our 
Environment, http://www.whitehouse.gov/energy (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (noting the 
President’s intent to “invest in a clean energy future”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
 83.   The White House, President Barack Obama, Develop and Secure America’s 
Energy Resources, http://www.whitehouse.gov/energy/securing-american-energy#energy-
menu (last visited Jan. 7, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, 
Climate, and the Environment).  
 84.   See Higgs, supra note 72, at 531 (recounting ways in which President Obama’s 
administration has used government to combat market failures associated with the current 
economic downturn). The word “liberal” is employed throughout this essay in its popular 
usage—i.e. the political “left”—as opposed to the more traditional meaning of the word to 
refer to what American politics now calls “libertarianism,” which has become associated 
with the political “right.” See generally, Johnson Blog, Liberalism and Libertarianism, THE 
ECONOMIST (Oct. 8, 2010), http://www.economist.com/blogs/johnson/2010/10/ism_week 
(explaining the usages of the terms) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, 
Climate, and the Environment).  
 85.   See Bryan Caplan, Externalities, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS AND LIBERTY 
(2008), http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Externalities.html (“Externalities are probably 
the argument for government intervention that economists most respect.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).  
 86.   For example, the purchase of gasoline for a gas-guzzling car exacerbates the 
pollution of the air and the buildup of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere—both of which 
harm many persons who were not, of course, party to the gasoline purchase. Accordingly, 
this economic argument goes, it is appropriate for government to act in response to this 
market flaw. See id. (noting the appropriate role of government in addressing externalities).  
 87.   Pub. L. No. 109-58, 199 Stat. 194 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).  
 88.   Id. pmbl. 
 89.   Id. tit. XVII, §§ 1701-1706 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 16511-16516). 
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technologies.”90 Categories of technology included “renewable energy 
systems.”91 
 The sun is an attractive source of natural, renewable energy; 
billions of watts of energy arrive through light photons emanating from 
nuclear reactions on the nearest star to the Earth.92 Green plants, of course, 
power themselves efficiently from solar energy through photosynthesis.93 
Solar energy was first converted directly into electricity in 1954, when 
scientists discovered that the element silicon, when exposed to sunlight, 
creates an electric charge.94 Thin panels, called photovoltaic cells (“PVs”), 
were used to power spacecraft in the 1960s.95 By the 1970s, when fossil 
fuel prices rose, many environmentalists looked to solar as the bright, clean, 
renewable future of electricity.96 Nonetheless, the high start-up costs of 
solar power, including local permitting, have discouraged producers and 
consumers from relying on solar systems.97 Despite a plethora of 
government carrots to use solar energy,98 in 2010 only one one-hundredth 
of one percent of U.S. energy came directly from the sun.99 
 In order to carry out its new duties under the Energy Policy Act, the 
Department of Energy established from scratch a Loan Program Office.100 
                                                                                                                 
 90.   Id. at §§ 1702(a), 1703(a)(1), (2) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 16512(a), 16513(a)(1), 
(2)). 
 91.   Id. at § 1703(b) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 16513(b)).  
 92.   See Michael Sobel, The Sun’s Energy, CUNY-BROOKLYN, 
http://academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/physics/sobel/Nucphys/sun.html (last visited Sept. 1, 
2012) (discussing the physical properties of the sun) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).  
 93. See id. (“[L]ight and heat from the sun are the basis of (almost) all life on earth. 
Sunlight drives plant life via photosynthesis, and animals survive by eating plants.”). 
 94.   See Nat’l Renewable Energy Lab., Solar Photovoltaic Technology Basics (May 
18, 2012), http://www.nrel.gov/learning/re_photovoltaics.html (discussing basic principles 
of PV technology) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the 
Environment). 
 95.   See id. (noting uses of PVs).  
 96.   See JOHN J. BERGER, CHARGING AHEAD: THE BUSINESS OF RENEWABLE ENERGY 
AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR AMERICA 5 (1997) (disusing the optimism of the 1970s). 
 97.  See Dep’t of Energy, Top 6 Things You Didn't Know About Solar Energy (June 22, 
2012 4:55 PM), http://energy.gov/articles/top-6-things-you-didnt-know-about-solar-energy 
(noting the regulatory burdens on the solar industry) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).  
 98.   See, e.g., Database of State Incentives for Renewable Energy Solar, 
http://www.dsireusa.org/solar/summarymaps (last visited Sept. 1, 2012) (compiling a variety 
of carrots for solar technology) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, 
Climate, and the Environment).  
 99.   Lawrence Livermore Lab., Estimated Energy Use in 2010 (Oct. 2011), 
https://flowcharts.llnl.gov (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, 
and the Environment). By contrast, wind power created eight times more energy. Id.  
 100.   See House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 9 (noting that the Energy Policy 
Act of 2005 authorized the Department of Energy to establish a loan office). 
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As of early 2008, however, the office had only four employees to carry out 
a potentially multi-million dollar program.101 As is all too typical with new 
congressional mandates, however, Congress was more attracted to creating 
new regulatory programs than to the unpleasant task of funding them under 
public budget constraints. This phenomenon has been noted in connection 
with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, which is chronically 
overburdened to the extent that is has been called a “dysfunctional” 
agency.102 In 2007 and 2008, both congressional oversight committees and 
the Government Accountability Office criticized the Energy Department for 
its slowness in implementing the loan guarantee program.103  
  In response to a solicitation from the Energy Department in 2008, 
the Solyndra Corporation of Fremont, California, applied for a loan 
guarantee.104 Solyndra, which was one of more than 100 companies to 
apply, manufactured photovoltaic systems using a unique cylindrical design 
for panels that, the company claimed, were easier to install and more 
efficient than other panels in the market.105 The benefits of a cylindrical 
panel, the company stated, were that they “capture sunlight across a 360-
degree photovoltaic surface capable of converting direct, diffuse, and 
reflected sunlight into electricity.”106 Moreover, Solyndra’s panels did not 
                                                                                                                 
 101.   See House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 9 (discussing the troubled 
beginning of the program). Compare this number to the number of employees that a private 
firm likely would assign to a much smaller task. 
 102.   See, e.g., Sidney Shapiro, Rena Steinzor & Matthew Shultz, Regulatory 
Dysfunction: 
How Insufficient Resources, Outdated Laws, and Political Interference Cripple the 
‘Protector Agencies’, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM (Aug. 2009), available at 
http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/RegDysfunction_906.pdf (discussing how the 
lack of funding and other Congressional assistance has hampered important government 
agencies). 
 103.   See House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 10 (citing hearings and GAO 
reports). 
 104.   See House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 9. Many of the citations in the 
story are to a comprehensive 2012 report by the majority (Republican) staff of the U.S. 
House Committee on Energy and Commerce. The Republican members of the Committee 
are of course politically opposed to President Obama. This Essay highlights facts that are in 
dispute.  
 105.   See House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 10 (laying out the facts in 
dispute). 
 106.   Solyndra Corp., Solyndra Cylindrical Module, 
http://www.solyndra.com/technology-products/cylindrical-module (last visited Nov. 7, 
2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the 
Environment). The company further explained:  
Collecting light around a 360 degree surface allows it to capture more light early 
and late in the day, with broader shoulders and less peak during the day. This 
consistent power generation during the day allows the use of a smaller inverter, 
saving costs and benefits the overall energy yield of a system over time.  
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use silicon, the most commonly used component, the price of which had 
risen sharply during 2007 and 2008 due in part to a supply shortage.107 One 
significant drawback to Solyndra’s panels, however, was that they were 
effective only on flat, white roofs, but not on slanted roofs.108 The company 
planned to use the federal loan to build a production facility known as “Fab 
2,” the total cost of which was estimated at $713 million.109 The requested 
loan guarantee from the government was for $535 million.110   
 The Energy Department’s Loan Program Office in late 2008 hired 
an independent engineering expert to examine the application.111 The 
Department’s chief financial officer at the time later told Congress that the 
agency pushed the Solyndra application in part because of a “general desire 
to do something” before the end of the Bush Administration and because 
the California company’s application was “further along” than others.112 
But the Department’s Credit Review Board concluded on January 9, 2009, 
that Solyndra’s application was “premature.”113 Among the concerns was 
the lack of an independent market analysis.114 Another concern was a news 
report that the solar panel industry was becoming oversupplied; an e-mail 
                                                                                                                 
Id. 
 107.   See id. (explaining that Solyndra’s panels used copper indium gallium diselenide). 
 108.  See House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 10 (pointing out a drawback to 
Solyndra’s panels). 
 109.   See House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 10–11 (describing the plan for 
building the production facility). 
 110.   See House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 11 (stating the nominal value of 
the requested loan). 
 111.   See House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 11–12 (explaining the application 
review process). 
 112.   See House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 13–14 (citing an interview with 
Chief Financial Officer of the U.S. Department of Energy, Steve Isakowitz).  
 113.   See House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 15 (laying out the Department’s 
findings). 
 114.   See House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 15–16 (discussing 
recommendations made during the Jan. 9, 2009 meeting of the Credit Committee) (citing 
Memorandum from Chairman of the Loan Guarantee Credit Committee to Director of the 
Loan Guarantee Program Office, Credit Committee Recommendation re: Solyndra Fab 2 
LLC, solar photovoltaic power panel project for a loan guarantee of $535,000,000). This 
point was highlighted by Kelly Colyar, Chief of Credit Policy in the Loan Program Office. 
Interestingly, this was the first of many instances in which a woman warned against the 
excessive risks in the Solyndra carrot—a phenomenon of gender that echoes the frequently-
cited role of women warning against the subprime housing boom of the early 21st century. 
See, e.g., Keith Chrostowski, Commentary: Three Female Regulators' Warnings About 
Financial Crisis Were Ignored, K.C. STAR (Jan. 30, 2012), available at 
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/01/30/137029/commentary-three-female-regulators.html 
(discussing the warnings against the housing boom).   
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message on January 13 cited a USA Today story entitled “Glut of Roof Top 
Solar Systems.”115   
 When President Obama’s Secretary of Energy, Steven Chu, took 
office in late January 2009, however, he pressed for quicker movement on 
the loan guarantee program.116 As one advisor testified before Congress in 
March, “Secretary Chu has directed us to accelerate the process 
significantly and deliver the first loans in a matter of months, while 
maintaining appropriate oversight and due diligence to protect taxpayers’ 
interests.”117 The Department’s Chief Financial Officer, Steven Isakowitz, 
later stated that, although Chu did not impose deadlines, he pressed the 
Loan Program Office to “move much faster.”118               
 The congressional hearings concerned President Obama’s 
“stimulus” initiative, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
(“Recovery Act”), signed into law in February 2009.119 One provision 
authorized $6 billion for spending on loan guarantees for innovative energy, 
with the stipulation that the projects had to start by 2011; it placed more of 
the risk of loan defaults on the government.120 The idea of the Recovery Act 
was to pump money rapidly into the economy through “shovel-ready” 
projects in order to pull the nation out of a deep recession.121 One result was 
to push the Energy Department to make quicker decisions on loans.122 
Meanwhile, Solyndra hired Steve McGee, a former Democratic Senate aide, 
to lobby in Washington.123 
                                                                                                                 
 115.   E-mail of Lachlan Steward (Jan. 13, 2009), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/09/23/us/politics/20110923_solar_document.html
?ref=solyndra#annotation/a33571.  
 116.  See House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 16 (pointing out the changes 
associated with Steven Chu taking office). 
 117.   See House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 16 (providing a statement of 
Matthew Rogers, then-Senior Advisor to the Sec’y of Energy for Recovery Act 
Implementation, U.S. Dep’t of Energy) (citing Processes for Management and Oversight of 
ARRA Activities: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Investigations & Oversight of the H. 
Comm. on Sci. & Tech., 111th Cong. 7 (2009)). 
 118.   House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 16. 
 119.   American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No.111-5, 123 Stat. 
1115 (codified at scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).    
 120.   Id. tit. 17, 123 Stat. 140.  
 121.  See House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 16 (describing the idea behind the 
Recovery Act). 
 122.   See House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 16 (providing testimony that the 
Recovery Act pushed the Department to “reduce the time cycle” for loan reviews). 
 123.   N.Y. TIMES, Blinding Officials to a Solar Energy Company’s Condition, 5, 
available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/09/23/us/politics/20110923_solar_document.html
?ref=Solyndra (last visited Nov. 7, 2012) (providing a special report of documents about 
Solyndra).  
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 A rapid decision on the Solyndra application was spurred by 
Matthew Rogers, advisor to Secretary Chu on expenditures under the 
Recovery Act.124 A loan office staff member sent an e-mail message on 
March 5 stating: “Hot off the press. Dates were reviewed with Matt Rogers. 
The wish is to have Solyndra through the [Department’s credit review 
board] in time for the President’s speech in California on the 18th.” 125 
Another e-mail from an Office of Management and Budget employee on 
March 6 stated that “DOE staff just told me that there’s a 99 percent 
certainty that President Obama, on March 19th in California for other 
reasons will announce that DOE is offering a loan guarantee to Solyndra. 
As far as I can tell, the obligation won’t be entered into until May, but once 
the president endorses it, I doubt seriously that the secretary will withdraw 
for any reason.”126 Rogers himself later testified, however, that the speech 
was not the impetus for quick action; rather, that they were “two different 
events.”127  
 Solyndra and the Department reached an agreement on essential 
terms of the proposed loan guarantee on March 10.128 Steven Isakowitz, 
chief of the Loan Program Office, wrote to Secretary Chu’s chief of staff 
that the Office Credit Review Board meeting would be moved up to March 
13, instead of March 19, after learning that that the White House had “great 
interest” in the Solyndra guarantee.129 There was a problem, however, with 
the President’s highlighting of Solyndra in his speech in California on 
March 19, 2009.130 The speech was planned for Los Angeles, far from the 
corporation’s headquarters near the San Francisco Bay; it appears that 
Ronald Klain, chief of staff to Vice President Biden, had misunderstood the 
                                                                                                                 
 124.   See House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 18 (discussing “Swat teams [sic] 
on Solyndra, Beacon And [Redacted]”) (citing E-mail from Matt Rogers to Steve Isakowitz 
and David Frantz (Feb. 21, 2009, 2:07 AM)). 
 125.   See House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 18 (discussing “Project 
Processing Timelines” and attaching an Excel spreadsheet entitled “Project Processing 
Accelerated Timelines-Shaded”) (citing E-mail from Dir., U.S. Dep’t Energy Loan Programs 
Office, to Program Manager, U.S. Dep’t of Energy Loan Programs Office et al. (Mar. 5, 
2009, 5:10 PM)).   
 126.   See House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 30–31 (citing E-mail from 
Program Analyst, OMB, to Kevin Carroll, Energy Branch Chief, OMB et al. (Mar. 6, 2009, 
10:56 AM)). 
 127.   See House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 19 (explaining that the President’s 
speech and the Committee meetings were separate events). 
 128.   See House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 20 (stating the date on which the 
agreement was reached). 
 129.   See House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 20 (relating the reason behind the 
change in the date of the meeting).  
 130.  See House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 20 (highlighting a problem with 
the allotted time slot for the Committee meeting). 
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location of the company.131 Klain discussed the option of having Solyndra 
officials travel to Southern California, or, with the option eventually 
chosen, having the President discuss another clean energy project.132  
On March 17, 2009, the Energy Department’s Credit Review 
Board, which only two months earlier had held off a decision, approved 
Solyndra’s application.133 The approval was subject to conditions that 
would be hashed out over the next few months.134 Chief among the 
concerns was a desire for proof of how Solyndra’s product would fare 
against competitors in the solar panel market.135 Although the Credit 
Review Board did not appear to discuss it, the price of silicon, used in 
competitors’ panels, was falling during 2009 as the result of increased 
production.136 This market change cut away at the supposed advantage for 
Solyndra’s non-silicon panels.137      
 Meanwhile, the Energy Department was required by the Energy 
Policy Act to consult with the Department of the Treasury before making 
the loan guarantee.138 Treasury employees later testified that their 
consultation was “rushed” into a few days.139 In particular, Treasury official 
                                                                                                                 
 131.   See House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 20 (asking to confirm that 
Solyndra was in Los Angeles) (citing E-mail from Ron Klain to Matt Rogers and Rod 
O’Connor (Mar. 10, 2009, 10:06 AM)); E-mail from Ron Klain to Matt Rogers and Rod 
O’Connor (Mar. 10, 2009, 10:30 AM) (pointing out that the President’s speech was 
scheduled for Los Angeles).  
 132.   See House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 21 (citing various e-mail 
discussions). 
 133. See House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 21, 23 (“Less than two months 
after it had remanded the Solyndra application during the Bush Administration . . . the CRB 
meeting went forward on March 17, 2009. . . . After just over one hour of discussion, the 
CRB unanimously approved the offer to Solyndra of a $535 million loan guarantee.”). 
 134. See House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 23–24 (“Title XVII provides that 
the “Secretary shall make guarantees . . . for projects on such terms and conditions as the . . . 
Secretary determines . . . .”). 
 135. See House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 23 (noting “the March Credit 
Committee’s request for additional information about Solyndra’s market competitors”).  
 136. See House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 12 (“By the time DOE decided to 
award a conditional commitment to Solyndra in March 2009, the price for polysilicon was 
dropping sharply, dramatically affecting the viability of Solyndra’s business model.”) (citing 
Philip Brown, Cong. Research Serv., R42058, Market Dynamics That May have Contributed 
to Solyndra’s Bankruptcy, at 1–3 (Oct. 25, 2011), available at 
http://www.crs.gov/Products/R/PDF/R42058.pdf).  
 137. See House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 12 (“At the time DOE began its 
due diligence of the Solyndra application in 2008, the solar market was a much different 
place than it is today.”). 
 138. 42 U.S.C. § 16512(a). 
 139. See House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 24 (“Although Treasury officials 
told the Treasury IG that there was ‘enough time’ to review the terms and conditions of the 
Solyndra guarantee, the Treasury IG nonetheless concluded that the consultation was 
‘rushed.’”) (citing Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Audit Rep’t: 
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Paula Farrell complained on March 17 that Treasury wanted “not to be 
brought in at the tail end when the terms of the deal had already been 
negotiated.”140 In particular, Treasury staff expressed concern over the large 
ratio of debt in the debt-to-equity split proposed by the Energy 
Department.141 Two days later, however, Treasury informed Energy of its 
“clearance” to approve the loan guarantee deal.142  
 The Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”), which is the 
executive branch’s financial watchdog, also reviewed the proposed 
Solyndra loan.143 Although OMB official Sally Ericsson wrote on March 10 
that “[t]his deal is NOT ready for prime time,” referring to the plan to have 
President Obama tout the Solyndra loan on March 19, OMB did not 
endeavor to stop the deal.144 The Energy Department granted to Solyndra a 
conditional loan guarantee on March 19, 2009.145 This was the first such 
loan guarantee under the Energy Policy Act.146 
 From March through August 2009, Solyndra and the Energy 
Department each took steps toward finalizing the deal. The company raised 
                                                                                                                 
Consultation on Solyndra Loan Guarantee Was Rushed [hereinafter TREASURY IG REPORT], 
OIG-12-048, at 5–7 (Aug. 2, 2012), available at 
http://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/files/analysi
s/20120802solyndra.pdf).  
 140. House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 26 (quoting E-mail from Paula Farrell, 
Dir., U.S. Dep’t of Treasury Office of Policy & Legislative Review, to Ken Carfine, Fiscal 
Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury et al. (Mar. 17, 2009, 4:27 PM)). Note that it was a 
woman who expressed a desire for caution. 
 141. See House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 28 (“The concerns listed in the 
Treasury IG’s Audit Report were the same as those identified by Mr. Burner, mainly, the 
debt-to-equity split, Treasury’s ‘preference for a partial guarantee versus 100 percent 
guarantee,’ and DOE’s rights to Solyndra’s intellectual property in the event of a default.”) 
(citing TREASURY IG REPORT, supra note 139, at 5). 
 142. See House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 29 (“Mr. Carfine emailed 
Secretary Geithner’s Chief of Staff, Mr. Patterson, on March 19, 2009, and informed him 
that Treasury was giving DOE ‘clearance to announce the program and sign the term 
sheet.’”) (citing E-mail from Ken Carfine to Mark Patterson et al. (Mar. 19, 2009, 4:00 
PM)). 
 143. See House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 30 (explaining OMB’s role and 
authority). 
 144. House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 31 (quoting E-mail from Sally 
Ericsson to Robert Nabors (Mar. 10, 2009, 11:59 AM)). Note that it was a woman who 
expressed a desire for caution. 
 145. See House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 31 (“As discussed above, DOE 
stimulus advisor, Mr. Rogers, emailed Mr. Klain to inform him of this event, and stated that 
the agreement was ‘setting us up for the first loan guarantee conditional commitment for the 
president’s visit to California on the 19th.’”).  
 146. See House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 31 (“Drafting these agreements 
was made more difficult by the fact that Solyndra was the first loan guarantee; the DOE 
Loan Programs Office was not able to work from a template or refer to past agreements.”). 
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$198 million from private investors, supplementing the federal loan.147 The 
largest private investor was Argonaut, the investment arm of the George 
Kaiser Family Foundation.148 Since the Solyndra bankruptcy, some critics 
have speculated that the Administration chose Solyndra or took excessive 
risks in order to please George Kaiser, an Oklahoma oilman, who was an 
important Obama fundraiser.149     
 Meanwhile, the Energy Department obtained a final credit rating 
and a marketing report on Solyndra’s prospects.150 In August 2009, Fitch 
Ratings assigned the Solyndra loan a double-B-minus rating for 
“speculative,” which it defines as indicating an “elevated vulnerability to 
default risk.”151 This rating should not be surprising. After all, a business 
with an apparently surefire profit-making plan does not need to seek out a 
government carrot; it can obtain financing easily from private sources. Only 
risky ventures need the government’s help. In any event, Fitch also 
estimated that there was an 89 % chance that the government could recover 
its investment in the case of default.152         
 Fitch noted that the price of solar panels was under “extreme 
competitive pressures” and that this would be the largest challenge to the 
success of the Solyndra’s Fab 2 plan.153 The Energy Department’s credit 
                                                                                                                 
 147. See House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 32 (“For Solyndra, the period 
between the conditional commitment and the loan closing in September 2009 was spent 
fulfilling the conditions precedent to closing—mainly, raising the $198 million in equity 
from investors.”). 
 148. See House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 32 (“Argonaut, the primary 
investment arm of the George Kaiser Family Foundation (GKFF), contributed $130 million 
of the $286 million Solyndra raised, becoming the company’s largest shareholder.”).  
 149. See, e.g., Matthew Mosk and Ronnie Greene, Did Obama Administration Cut 
Corners For a Green Energy Company?, ABC NEWS (May 24, 2011), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/obama-administration-
solyndra/story?id=13640783&singlePage=true#.UJUhbzkkBUQ (asking rhetorically if 
President Obama played favorites) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, 
Climate, and the Environment). While Kaiser’s participation was well known, as explained 
in the text, it is important to clarify that even the House Republican Energy Committee 
Report did not conclude that the decision to fund Solyndra was done in order to help 
Obama’s fundraiser. See House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 144–46 (discussing the 
influence of George Kaiser). 
 150. See House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 31 (“For DOE, this meant 
obtaining a final marketing report, a final credit rating assessment from the Fitch credit 
rating agency, and completing other due diligence.”). 
 151. See House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 32 (quoting Letter from Managing 
Director, Fitch Ratings, to Wilbur G. “Bill” Stover, CFO, Solyndra, Inc. (Aug. 7, 2009)).  
 152. See House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 33 (“In addition to the rating, 
Fitch estimated that there would be an 89 % chance of recovery in the event of default.”). 
 153. See House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 32–33 (“In the letter, Fitch noted 
that the pricing of photovoltaic solar panels was then under ‘extreme competitive pressures,’ 
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policy director once again expressed to her superiors her concerns over 
Solyndra’s financial projections, including its working capital and the 
potential for dangerous cost overruns.154 
 In the summer of 2009, White House interests once again affected 
the timing, and perhaps the substance, of the Energy Department’s 
decisions on Solyndra. This time, a chief catalyst appears to have been 
Aditya Kumar, Director for Special Projects for Rahm Emanuel, then chief 
of staff for President Obama.155 The chief of staff typically is the advisor 
with the closest day-to-day connection with the President. Inquiring on 
August 10 about when the Department would give its final approval to the 
Solyndra loan, Kumar asked about the “announcement value” of the loan 
finalization at a groundbreaking in Fremont, pointing out that it would “lead 
to thousands of new jobs.”156 The next day, Emanuel himself wrote in an e-
mail to the Energy Department that “we want to think about the potential 
announcement value in this,” and suggested that Vice President Biden 
participate in an event to publicize the Solyndra loan.157 A week later, Vice 
President Biden’s Chief Staff Ron Klain explained that “Rahm was super 
hot for this” because “[j]obs and high tech and Recovery Act is a winning 
combination.”158 
 On August 17, Kumar e-mailed scheduling personnel for President 
Obama and wrote that “Ron [Klain, Biden’s chief of staff] said this 
morning that the POTUS [President Obama] definitely wants to do this (or 
                                                                                                                 
and that these pressures ‘will be the largest challenge facing Solyndra and the largest credit 
risk incurred in repayment of the Fab 2 loan.’”). 
 154. See House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 34 (“If even a small amount of the 
project’s cash was ‘tied up in working capital,’ Ms. Colyar projected that the project ‘will 
face a funding shortfall’ and that ‘[e]ven one day of [Accounts Receivable] results in a 
negative cash balance.’”).  
 155. In 2013, Emanuel was mayor of Chicago, Illlinois. See generally About the Mayor, 
CITY OF CHICAGO, 
http://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/mayor/supp_info/about_the_mayor.html (last 
visited Nov. 1, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and 
the Environment).  
 156. House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 35 (quoting E-mail from Aditya 
Kumar, Dir. of Special Projects, The White House, to Jay Carney, Dir. of Comm., Office of 
the Vice President, Elizabeth Oxhorn, Spokeswoman for the Recovery Act, The White 
House & Ron Klain (Aug. 10, 2009, 11:07 PM)).  




 158. House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 39 (quoting E-mail from Heather 
Zichal to Ron Klain (Aug. 19, 2009) (reviewed in camera by Committee staff)).   
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Rahm definitely wants the POTUS to do this).”159 Kumar then pushed the 
scheduling personnel for a date for a presidential appearance; he was told 
that the earliest date available was September 8.160 Spurred by Kumar, 
Energy officials then requested that the President set aside time on this 
date.161 On August 19, the White House Staff created a Scheduling Proposal 
for President Obama, stating that the Solyndra loan proposal was a “prime 
example of a public-private partnership” and would create thousands of 
new jobs.162      
 On the same day, however, Kumar inquired about concerns 
expressed by Heather Zichal, a deputy to the White House climate change 
policy director.163 Zichal explained that the financial funding community 
was skeptical of Solyndra’s Fab 2 plan.164 Nonetheless, after being told of 
Emanuel’s enthusiasm for the planned Solyndra event, Zichal stated: “[B]ut 
if Rahm wants it, we’ll make it happen.”165 During the next week, plans for 
                                                                                                                 
 159. See House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 36 (quoting E-mail from Aditya 
Kumar to Alyssa Mastromonaco, Ass’t to the President & Dir. of Scheduling & Advance, 
The White House et al. (Aug. 17, 2009, 9:56 AM)). 
 160. See House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 36–37 (“Mr. Kumar asked about 
the President’s availability in early September for an appearance via satellite at the event . . . 
Ms. Crutchfield responded that the President’s schedule was ‘packed’ and that the earliest 
date available for a possible Solyndra event was September 8.”). 
 161. See House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 37 (“Forwarding his exchange 
with Ms. Crutchfield to DOE, Mr. Kumar asked…whether an event on or about September 
8, 2009, that would include in-person appearances by Secretary Chu and a senior White 
House official and satellite remarks by the President, would suit DOE’s schedule.”). 
 162. House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 40. 
 163. See House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 37 (“After discussing a possible 
announcement event with DOE, documents produced by the White House show that Mr. 
Kumar became aware that Heather Zichal, a top deputy to White House Office of Energy 
and Climate Change Policy Director Carol Browner, had concerns about the Solyndra 
event.”). The White House climate change policy director was Carol Browner, former 
administrator of EPA under President Clinton. See Carol Browner, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, 
http://www.americanprogress.org/about/staff/browner-carol/bio/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2013) 
(providing career data about Carol Browner) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal 
of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). Once again, it was a woman who expressed a 
desire for caution. During e-mail exchanges on Aug. 20, an Energy Department stimulus 
advisor sent to Kumar a list of Solyndra’s investors, including a biography of George Kaiser, 
the leading private investor and fundraiser for president Obama. See House Republican 
Report, supra note 78, at 227 (“The following day, he forwarded to Mr. Kumar a list of 
Solyndra’s major investors and a Forbes.com biography of George Kaiser.”) (citing E-mail 
from Steve Spinner to Aditya Kumar (Aug. 20, 2009, 11:54 AM)). 
 164. See House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 38–39 (stating that people in the 
financial community raised concerns about the Solyndra loan guarantee). 
 165. House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 39 (quoting E-mail from Heather 
Zichal, Deputy Assistant to President for Energy & Climate Change Policy, Deputy Dir., 
Office of Energy & Climate Change Policy to Ronald Klain, Chief of Staff to Vice President 
(Aug. 19, 2009)).  
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the announcement accelerated.166 Kumar wrote on August 25 that he now 
planned for Vice President Biden to speak by satellite, not on September 8 
but on September 4.167 The change, he explained, was because “[i]t’s the 
same day unemployment numbers come out, and we[] want to use this as an 
example of where the Recovery Act is helping [to] create new high tech 
jobs.”168        
 On the same day, however, the OMB briefed the Energy 
Department on its findings concerning the Solyndra loan.169 This briefing 
comprehensively summarized the financial aspects of the plan, including 
the risks that Solyndra would face stiff competition, especially over 
price.170 OMB specifically requested further information about the energy 
efficiency of Solyndra’s panels compared to that of competing panels.171     
 Three days later, an Energy Department official inquired anxiously 
whether the OMB would soon complete its review, because he had “the 
OVP [Office of the Vice President] and WH [White House] breathing down 
my neck on this.”172 Over the next few days, numerous officials from the 
White House and Energy Department badgered OMB to wrap up its 
review.173 On September 1, OMB staff met to discuss Solyndra.174 At least 
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one staff member stated that the questions about energy efficiency had not 
been answered satisfactorily.175 Others expressed concern that OMB had 
not had its usual thirty days in which to review the full details of the loan 
guarantee.176 Finally, however, on the afternoon of September 1, OMB staff 
concluded that it would not block the Solyndra loan guarantee.177    
 Three days later, on September 4, in Fremont, Solyndra broke 
ground for the Fab 2 facility, with Energy Secretary Chu in attendance and 
Vice President Biden appearing by satellite video.178 Thanking President 
Obama and the Energy Department, Solyndra noted in a news release that it 
was the first recipient of a loan under the Energy Policy Act.179 Boasting of 
a backlog of orders, Solyndra asserted that its operations “will produce 
enough solar panels over their lifetime to cut over 350 million metric tons 
of CO2 emissions or 850 million barrels of oil.”180  
During 2009, however, Solyndra’s business languished.181 With 
prices falling for competing silicon-based panels, the company’s cash flow 
deteriorated.182 Solyndra sought further financing, both from the 
government and from its private investors.183 In late 2009, Argonaut, the 
leading private investor, suggested the possibility of another federal loan 
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second [Department of Energy] loan guarantee and secure additional government assistance 
during this time period”).  
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guarantee of more than $400 million for additional work on Fab 2.184 
George Kaiser articulated to Steve Mitchell, the Managing Director of 
Argonaut Private Equity, in December “that he thought there was 
‘significant risk to getting a second loan (because of the political concern 
about giving too much to one supplicant and one technology).’”185 On 
February 24, 2010, Kaiser met with staff officials of the Office of Vice 
President Biden at the White House, where he discussed a variety of issues, 
including Solyndra.186 In a later message to the head of his Argonaut fund, 
Kaiser related that the government officials called Solyndra “one of their 
prime poster children.”187 The Energy Department once again began due 
diligence preparation for a second loan guarantee.188       
 In early 2010, however, Solyndra’s troubles were widely 
publicized.189 The company’s auditor, PricewaterhouseCoopers, filed on 
March 16 an addendum to Solyndra’s S-1 registration with the Securities 
and Exchange Commission.190 The document concluded soberly that the 
“[c]ompany has suffered recurring losses from operations, negative cash 
flows since inception and has a net stockholders’ deficit that, among other 
concerns, raises substantial doubt about its ability to continue as a going 
concern.”191   
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 190. House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 48 (citing Solyndra, Inc., Amendment 
to S-1 Registration Statement (Form S-1/A) (Mar. 16, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1443115/000119312510058567/ds1a.htm 
[hereinafter PWC S-1 Amendment]. 
 191. PWC S-1 Amendment, supra note 190. 
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 This document sounded alarms at the Energy Department and 
OMB and among private investors and the business press.192 One alarmist 
was Steve Westley, a venture capitalist and Obama contributor, who 
emailed an assistant to the President in May, citing the SEC filing and the 
perception that the company was burning through its capital.193 The 
pressing concern was that President Obama was about to make a publicized 
visit to Solyndra.194 After concluding that the situation was not dire, the 
White House went ahead with the event.195 President Obama spoke in 
Fremont on May 26, 2010.196 After touting his Administration’s financial 
help to students, seniors, and persons whose insurance had been dropped, 
he moved on to energy.197 Noting that America’s share of the solar panel 
industry had fallen over the previous decade, he cited the stimulus: “And 
we can see the positive impacts right here at Solyndra. Less than a year ago, 
we were standing on what was an empty lot. But through the Recovery Act, 
this company received a loan to expand its operations. This new factory is 
the result of those loans.” 198 He also said: “The true engine of economic 
growth will always be companies like Solyndra.”199     
 In June, however, Solyndra cancelled a planned initial public 
offering of stock— another sign of its weakening condition.200 Meanwhile, 
private investors looked to the government as a savior.201 One investor 
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wrote in August that “getting business from Uncle Sam is a principal 
element of Solyndra’s channel strategy.”202 A few months later, Argonaut’s 
chief wrote to Kaiser that “[t]he current thinking is that the White House 
chief of staff is the right person to approach— obviously big changes in that 
role and they have asked who has strong connections there.”203 Peter Rouse 
had replaced Rahm Emanuel as the President's chief of staff.204 The 
Argonaut chief soon thereafter expressed a hope that Kaiser could be a 
“direct pathway,”205 and that “[a]ll we are asking is that the WH helps us 
soften some of the terms of the DOE financing we received and work with 
us to give Solyndra the runway needed to take off (i.e. help us get some 
orders with DOD and others, which Obama offered to do in May). If they 
don’t, it will be a tragic failure of not just one high-potential company, but 
of an Obama effort to nurture an industry of the future.”206 Kaiser himself 
met with President Obama on Oct. 23, 2010; he later wrote that he 
discussed the solar business in general, including China’s subsidies of its 
solar panel industry and effects on American manufacturers, but not 
Solyndra specifically.207  
 As 2010 progressed, Solyndra’s financial condition worsened.208 In 
September, a consultant reported to the Energy Department that 
“Solyndra’s current cost structures are too high to compete long term in the 
solar PV market.”209 The report specifically mentioned lower-cost Chinese 
competitors.210 In October, Solyndra informed the Energy Department that 
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the company’s “situation has changed drastically.”211 Without additional 
loan funds, the company reported, it “would run out of cash in 
November.”212   
 Later in October, the Energy Department learned that Solyndra was 
planning to lay off 200 of its 1200 workers on October 28.213 During a 
company conference call with investors, however, a participant stated that 
“[t]he DOE has requested a delay until after the election (without 
mentioning the election), but management believes they need to 
communicate as quickly as possible . . . .”214 Solyndra made the layoff 
announcement in California on November 3, the day of the mid-term 
elections.215 At a congressional hearing a year later, Secretary Chu denied 
knowing of a request to delay the announcement, saying that “it is not the 
way I do business” and promising to investigate the matter.216 At about the 
same time, White House environmental advisors wrote to the President of 
their complaints with the Energy Department, including its “slow 
implementation” of the loan guarantee program and the excessive risks in 
these loans.217     
 As Solyndra’s precarious position became clear at the end of 2010, 
each stakeholder pushed an agendum.218 The company sought to restructure 
its loan to shore up its finances, while the investors and government sought 
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to improve their positions against the other in the event of a bankruptcy.219 
In December, Argonaut informed the Energy Department that it would 
commit additional money to Solyndra if the federal government agreed to 
commit an even larger amount of loan money.220 
 Eventually, the Energy Department agreed to a complex restructure 
of the loan guarantee, in which private investors lent another $75 million to 
Solyndra, and under which the government’s status as creditor was made 
subordinate to that of the private investors.221 The restructuring plan 
immediately raised questions about the legality of making taxpayer 
guarantees subordinate to private investment.222 The Energy Policy Act of 
2005, under which the loan was made, states: “The obligation shall be 
subject to the condition that the obligation is not subordinate to other 
financing.”223 The Energy Department’s Loan Policy Office asked for an 
opinion from law firm Morrison & Foerster L.L.P., which drafted a 
memorandum concluding that the law prohibited subordination.224 The 
Department, however, concluded that it was the best interpreter of the 
Act,225 and this memorandum was never finalized.226 Instead, the 
Department determined that the prohibition barred only subordination under 
the original terms of an obligation, not a restructuring.227 The statute’s use 
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of the word “is” was critical to this interpretation.228 Secretary Chu signed 
the Energy Department’s analysis on February 22, 2011.229    
 During 2011, Solyndra’s financial condition continued to 
worsen.230 The Energy Department recognized in May that bankruptcy was 
real possibility.231 In August, matters came to a head. On August 17, at a 
briefing for government officials, a consultant hired by the Department 
reported that “[a]bsent new funding in the near-term, the Company will be 
forced to begin an orderly wind-down of the business.”232 The next 
morning, the chief of the Department’s Loan Program Office left a phone 
message with George Kaiser for the second time in a week, citing a “matter 
of some urgency.”233 Kaiser decided not to return the call.234 Later that day, 
however, Argonaut decided to fund Solyndra’s operating capital for one 
more week.235 Meanwhile, other Energy Department officials were pushing 
to have Solyndra’s panels purchased for another government-funded solar 
program, called Amp, in which panels were to be installed on buildings 
managed by ProLogis, an international real estate company.236    
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 On August 31, 2011, Solyndra filed for bankruptcy.237 Due in large 
part to the subordination of the federal credit position to that of the private 
investors, it was unclear how much of the guaranteed loans the federal 
government would be able to recover, according to an analysis by the New 
York Times.238 
 
V.  Lessons from Solyndra about Carrots and Sticks 
 
 The Solyndra debacle offers subtle lessons. It is not a story—
despite its prominence during the 2012 campaign—of treachery in 
government. There was no bribery, no midnight conspiracies in a dark 
garage, and no plot to push the American economy into socialism. 
Nonetheless, the Solyndra debacle highlights the flaws of using carrots as 
environmental policy and helps to develop two powerful lessons. 
 
A. First Lesson: A Governmental Policy of Awarding Carrots is Inherently 
Susceptible to Infection by Politics 
 
 The Solyndra story shows how the ostensibly public-spirited goal 
of carrots for a renewable energy company became fatally infected with 
“politics”—meaning that short-term public relations or party interests 
trumped long-term environmental protection. The traditionally optimistic 
view of government has been challenged in recent decades by the public 
choice school of thought, which applies models of market behavior to 
lawmaking, in which private parties jostle in order to win legal benefits for 
themselves, with politicians and bureaucrats as their agents.239 Lawmakers 
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participate willingly if their primary incentives are to collect enough short-
term money and special-interest support to get elected or re-elected.240   
 Under this model, lawmakers are encouraged to press for 
glamorous projects that sprinkle benefits on important voter segments or 
financial contributors, even if the projects are flawed as matters of long-
term policy and public finance.241 Spending money on high-profile projects 
is attractive, under the concentrated benefits/distributed costs model, 
because the recipients of the concentrated benefits—lobbyists, contributors, 
and voter interest groups—are grateful, while the millions of taxpayers will 
be unlikely to identify this particular project as a significant factor in their 
taxes.242 One of the most famous examples is the long-standing suite of 
government carrots for corn ethanol production, which observers have 
connected to the out-sized influence of Iowa voters in the presidential 
primary campaigns.243 
                                                                                                                 
 240. See John H. Aldrich & Kenneth A. Shepsle, Explaining Institutional Change: 
Soaking, Poking and Modeling in the U.S. Congress, in CONGRESS ON DISPLAY, CONGRESS 
AT WORK 31 (William T. Bianco ed., 2000) (noting that legislators are guided by re-election, 
good policy, and in-chamber power); Pierre Lemieux, The Public Choice Revolution, 27 
REG. 22 (2004) (“Individuals, when acting as voters, politicians, or bureaucrats, continue to 
be self-interested and try to maximize their utility.”).  
 241. See Jeffrey S. Banks et al., The Politics of Commercial R&D Programs, in THE 
TECHNOLOGY PORK BARREL 57 (Linda R. Cohen & Roger G. Noll eds., 1991) (“If voters 
hold elected political officials responsible for the fate of a program that is providing local 
jobs, politicians can be expected to take into account the likely recipients of a program’s 
expenditures when evaluating it.”). 
 242. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, PHILIP FRICKEY, & ELIZABETH GARRETT, supra note 67, 
at 54–59 (explaining that under the concentrated benefits/distributed costs model, interest 
groups send benefits to legislators, who respond with governmental largesse, particularly if 
legislators believe that the electorate will remain unaware of the costs or can be deceived by 
“public-regarding half-truths about the statutory purposes”).  
 243. See, e.g., The Iowa Journal, The Caucuses: Ethanol Politics, IOWA PUB. 
TELEVISION (Jan. 3, 2008, 11:54 AM), http://www.iptv.org/iowajournal/story.cfm/143 
(noting the almost universal support of ethanol subsidies among presidential campaigners in 
recent election years) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and 
the Environment). There was a notable mention of this phenomenon in an episode of the 
acclaimed TV series West Wing, in which the public-spirited presidential candidate Matthew 
Santos is cajoled into supporting ethanol subsidies by campaign manager Josh Lyman, who 
tells him: “You walk out on that stage and come out against ethanol, you are dead meat. 
Bambi would have a better shot of getting elected President of the NRA than you will have 
of getting a single vote in this caucus.” See id. (discussing characterizations of ethanol as 
“the ultimate political pander” in popular culture). Indeed, the ethanol carrots extend so far 
as to require motor fuel companies to use a certain percentage of biofuels that do not exist. 
See Matthew Wald, A Fine for Not Using a Biofuel That Doesn’t Exist, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 
2012), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/10/business/energy-
environment/companies-face-fines-for-not-using-unavailable-biofuel.html (discussing the 
Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, which requires the addition of cellulosic 
acid, a commercially-unavailable biofuel, to fuel). 
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 In the Solyndra debacle, politics appears to have infected many 
policy choices. There is no scientific proof, of course, but there are many 
points of obvious political influence.244 At the outset, Congress may have 
been encouraged by the prospect of awarding carrots to influential or 
contributing private parties in enacting the Energy Policy Act of 2005;245 it 
also fits a model in which politicians attract votes by appearing to take 
decisive steps, even when the action is in reality too small, too expensive, 
or too unfocused.246 Certainly, the decision to speed up approval of 
Solyndra’s application was spurred by a political desire to take bold action 
to stimulate the economy, even though it risked a rash and dangerous 
decision.247 The government’s financial watchdogs—OMB and the 
Treasury Department—were largely ignored in their exhortation to the 
Energy Department to take more time to consider Solyndra’s application.248 
Indeed, the timing of a political event—a planned visit of President Obama 
to California—appears to have been a driving force in the rushed 
conditional approval of the loan guarantee.249 
                                                                                                                 
 244. See House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 146 (concluding that Solyndra 
shows how political pressures and a desire to create political events that highlight policy 
goals can result in poor decision-making).   
 245. See generally Lindsay Renick Mayer, Big Oil, Big Influence, NOW ON PBS (Aug. 
1, 2008), http://www.pbs.org/now/shows/347/oil-politics.html (stating that the Energy Policy 
Act of 2005 was based on recommendations from then-Vice President Cheney’s Energy 
Task Force, which relied on advice from major oil and energy companies, which had been 
donors of the Bush Administration) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, 
Climate, and the Environment); Alexei Barrionuevo, Boom in Ethanol Reshapes Economy of 
Heartland, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 26, 2006), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/25/business/25ethanol.html?ref=ethanol&pagewanted=pri
nt (“Last year, spurred by soaring energy prices, the ethanol lobby broke through in its long 
campaign to win acceptance outside the corn belt, inserting a provision in the Energy Policy 
Act of 2005.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the 
Environment). 
 246. See, e.g., Steven J. Dubner, It’s Not the President, Stupid, FREAKANOMICS (Mar. 8, 
2012), http://www.freakonomics.com/2012/03/08/it%E2%80%99s-not-the-president-stupid-
a-new-marketplace-podcast (arguing that the President has little direct influence over the 
economy, but presidential candidates act as if the President has influence over the economy 
because voters tend to blame or credit the President for the state of the economy) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).  
 247. See House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 146 (“DOE pushed forward with 
the guarantee despite . . . warnings because of the Obama Administration’s desire to use the 
Solyndra guarantee to highlight its stimulus.”); see also supra notes 101–14 and 
accompanying text. 
 248. See supra notes 115–28, 149–56 and accompanying text. See House Republican 
Report, supra note 78, at 128 (concluding that “[t]he timing of the Solyndra Conditional 
Commitment was coordinated with the White House, and scheduled before DOE had 
reached an agreement with the company on key terms.”). 
 249. See supra notes 108–14 and accompanying text. See House Republican Report, 
supra note 78, at 133 (finding that [t]he White House and the Department of Energy 
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 Once the company reported signs of serious financial difficulties, 
the Energy Department restructured its creditor status to one of 
subordination—a highly unusual and arguably unlawful step—possibly 
because of the influence of the top private investor in Solyndra, Argonaut, 
which is affiliated with George Kaiser, a significant Obama contributor. 250 
Argonaut benefitted by the government’s subordination.251 Even small 
points, such as apparent government influence over the delay of Solyndra’s 
announcement of employee layoffs until the day of the 2010 national 
election, show the creeping influence of politics.252 The Fact Checker 
column for the Washington Post, which usually supports President Obama’s 
policies, concluded that “the clean-energy program was infused with 
politics at every level and that the Administration remained steadfast in 
supporting the solar-panel maker despite clear warning signs of a potential 
collapse.”253   
 These examples of political influence concern a single carrot—the 
award and maintenance of a loan guarantee to the Solyndra Corporation of 
Fremont, California. It takes little imagination to recognize other potential 
points of political manipulation in other contexts—from the crude, such as 
bribery, “pay to play,” and quid pro quo deals with lobbyists and 
contributors,254 to the subtle, such as awarding carrots to parties in 
                                                                                                                 
scheduled a public announcement event to commemorate the closing of the Solyndra loan 
guarantee before OMB had reviewed the transaction, impacting the length and quality of 
OMB’s review.”).  
 250. See supra notes 174–79, 188–95 and accompanying text. See House Republican 
Report, supra note 78, at 144 (finding that “George Kaiser was closely involved in important 
decisions related to Solyndra throughout the life of the loan guarantee.”); see Josh Hicks, 
President Obama and Crony Capitalism: Examining Mitt Romney’s Claims, THE FACT 
CHECKER, WASH. POST. (Feb. 20, 2012, 6:02 AM), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/post/president-obama-and-crony-
capitalism-examining-mitt-romneys-claims/2012/02/17/gIQAGRTQKR_blog.html 
[hereinafter Crony Capitalism] (concluding that “[o]verall, the facts of the Solyndra matter 
represent a strong case for Romney’s claims of crony capitalism, but they don’t provide 
conclusive evidence.”). 
 251. Supra notes 188–90 and accompanying text. 
 252. Supra notes 184–86 and accompanying text. 
 253. See Crony Capitalism, supra note 253 (describing the actions that the Obama 
Administration took while allegedly looking the other direction at what was really going on). 
 254. See Monica Davey, Blagojevich Draws 14-Year Sentence for Corruption 
Conviction, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2011), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/08/us/blagojevich-expresses-remorse-in-courtroom-
speech.html?ref=rodrblagojevich (discussing perhaps the most notable recent instance of 
corruption involving former Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich, who was convicted in 2011 
of corruption and perjury charges).   
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influential “swing” states before elections and choosing glamorous but 
ineffective projects in order to gather votes in the short-term.255  
 It is ironic, of course, that the apparent political advantage of 
awarding a carrot to Solyndra came back to bite the Obama Administration. 
Had President Obama and Secretary Chu known in 2009 and 2010 that the 
Solyndra debacle would become the most prominent environmental topic of 
the 2012 election—while disturbing news about climate change was largely 
ignored—they surely would have nipped the carrot in the bud. But they did 
not know and politicians are by nature optimistic. In fact, it is impossible to 
say, in hindsight, whether any analyst would have known when President 
Obama took office that Solyndra was bound to fail. But we may conclude 
that government is innately optimistic about its ability to shape the market 
for the better through its carrots, which leads to the next lesson of the 
Solyndra debacle.256 
 
B.  Second Lesson: Government is Inherently Inaccurate in Awarding 
Carrots to Private Parties in the Competitive Market 
 
 Because carrots are typically awarded to only one or a few 
participants in the market, some free market economists criticize 
government intervention as “picking winners and losers.”257 In the first 
carrot awarded under the Energy Policy Act, the Solyndra Corporation was 
the short-term winner.258 The most obvious losers in the long run were the 
                                                                                                                 
 255. See supra notes 207–08 and accompanying text (discussing that some critics have 
cited the example of the Obama Administration’s rejection of Yucca Mountain, Nev., as the 
site of the national nuclear waste repository, despite decades of work, apparently to appease 
Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid and the voters of the swing state of Nevada); See 
Editorial, After Yucca, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2012), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/16/opinion/after-yucca-mountain.html (“During the 2008 
campaign, President Obama sought to curry favor with Nevada voters by pledging to shut 
down the Yucca project altogether.”). 
 256. See House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 132 (suggesting that the DOE was 
overly optimistic and ignored red flags about Solyndra). 
 257. See, e.g., House Republican Report, supra note 78, at  147 (concluding that 
“Solyndra is a prime example of the perils that come when the Federal government plays 
investor, tries to keep a company and industry afloat with subsides and attempt to pick the 
winners and losers in a particular marketplace.”); Stephen Moore & Dean Stansel, Ending 
Corporate Welfare as We Know It, THE CATO INSTITUTE, POLICY ANALYSIS no. 225 (May 
12, 1995), available at http://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/ending-corporate-
welfare-we-know-it [hereinafter Ending Corporate Welfare] (criticizing government 
carrots); Neil B. Niman, Picking Winners and Losers in the Global Technology Race, 13 
CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 77, 80–82 (1995) (criticizing government’s picking of winners and 
losers, especially under President Clinton’s policies).  
 258. See House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 146–47 (describing that although 
Solyndra won, the U.S. lost). 
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American taxpayers; other potential losers were solar industry competitors 
to Solyndra, other businesses generating renewable energy, such as wind, 
wave, and nuclear, and, perhaps, the sellers of fossil fuels.259 The essence of 
the free market criticism of government’s choosing winners and losers is 
that government does a poor job of picking the best winners, especially in a 
world of politicized decisions.260 
 A more nuanced view is that government is not merely picking a 
winner, but is making a “bet” that the awarded company will be able to use 
the carrot to develop new technology that will help the nation in the long 
run.261 Government can make bets on projects that are too risky for private 
investors, but that may pay off over time, especially for services such as 
solar energy, which provides a positive externality to the public, in that it 
obviates some need for fossil fuels.262 But the question remains: Do we trust 
government to award carrots efficiently, so as to result in a good record of 
bets that pay off?263   
 When government makes bets, it faces obstacles that private 
investors do not face. The most significant is that government moves in 
discrete, deliberate, legally mandated steps that make it slow to react to 
changes in the markets. Consider the award of carrots to Solyndra. The 
process began in 2005, when Congress enacted the Energy Policy Act, 
which locked in for years to come a bureaucratic system of awarding loan 
guarantees to projects for “renewable energy systems.”264 With this, the 
                                                                                                                 
 259. See House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 146 (discussing the other 
companies that also failed under the stimulus funding).  
 260. See, e.g., Ending Corporate Welfare, supra note 257 (asserting that “[t]he 
federal government has a poor record of picking industrial winners and losers”); Robert 
Higgs, Cumulating Policy Consequences, Frightened Overreactions, and the Current Surge 
of Government's Size, Scope, and Power, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 531, 551 (2010) 
[hereinafter Cumulating Policy] (criticizing a policy of choosing winners and losers). 
 261. See Michael Borrus & Jay Stowsky, Technology Policy and Economic Growth 10 
(Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy, UC Berkeley Working Paper No. 97, 
1997), available at http://escholarship.org/uc/item/5dc781j5 (last visited Nov. 22, 2012) 
[hereinafter Technology Policy] (“Picking winners and losers is the wrong metaphor to 
characterize the socially useful and necessary activity of government in supporting that 
process. Government is actually placing a bet on our collective future.”). 
 262. See Adam B. Jaffe et al., A Tale of Two Market Failures: Technology and 
Environmental Policy, 54 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 164, 172–73 (2005) (referring to solar energy 
as providing a positive externality).  
 263. See Jeffrey Ball, Tough Love for Renewable Energy: Making Wind and Solar 
Power Affordable, 91 FOREIGN AFF. 122, 131 (2012) (critiquing the practice of bets on 
technology as shortsighted); see Peter Z. Grossman, U.S. Energy Policy and the Presumption 
of Market Failure, 29 CATO J. 295, 313 (2009) (“. . .history has demonstrated that 
government energy programs reach for more than they are ever likely [to] achieve, and end 
up misallocating resources”). 
 264. 42 U.S.C. § 16513(a), (b) (2006). 
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government made a commitment to favor this technique (and its costs) over 
other methods of fostering positive externalities in energy production, such 
as subsidies for greater production of traditional nuclear energy265 or for 
switching electrical generation from coal to somewhat cleaner natural 
gas.266 When the Obama Administration decided in 2009 to accelerate the 
award of carrots under the Act, in order to fulfill campaign pledges and 
stimulate the economy, it was constrained by the limited number of 
applications, such as Solyndra’s.267 Although sources were reporting that 
prices for competing silicon-based solar panels were falling in 2009, it 
appears that the Obama Administration ignored the warnings, apparently 
because the wheels of bureaucracy were already in motion.268 Moreover, 
                                                                                                                 
 265. Support for nuclear energy has plummeted across the world after the tsunami-
related disaster at Japan’s Fukushima nuclear plant in 2011. See, e.g., Stefan Nicola & Tino 
Andresen, Merkel’s Green Shift Forces Germany to Burn More Coal, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 17, 
2012, 11:59 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-19/merkel-s-green-shift-
forces-germany-to-burn-more-coal-energy.html (explaining the change in public policy in 
Europe’s largest economy away from nuclear power, largely as a result of the Japanese 
disaster) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the 
Environment). An American law that favored nuclear energy would not have been able to 
anticipate such a change; nor would a law enacted today that encourages alternatives to 
nuclear energy be able to anticipate a possible resurgence in the popularity of nuclear energy 
in the near future. Finally, it is obvious that the Solyndra debacle, which may cast a cloud 
over solar energy in the United States for years to come, was not anticipated either by 
Congress or federal agencies. 
 266. See Kevin Begos, AP Impact: CO2 Emissions in US Drop to 20-Year Low, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 16, 2012, 10:39 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/ap-impact-co2-
emissions-us-drop-20-year-low (noting a decrease in carbon emissions to a 20-year low in 
the United States, largely attributable to electrical power producers shifting from coal to 
natural gas, following a decrease in price of the latter fossil fuel) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
 267. See House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 16–17 (illustrating the increased 
pressure to finalize the Solyndra project). 
 268. See House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 130–32 (discussing the warnings 
of 2008 and 2009). One of the most prominent news reports was made just weeks before the 
Energy Department made its final loan commitment to Solyndra in September 2009. See 
Kate Galbraith, As Prices Slump, Solar Industry Suffers, N.Y. TIMES GREEN BLOG (Aug. 13, 
2009, 6:02 PM), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/13/as-prices-slump-solar-industry-
suffers (noting price decreases and the increase in production from China) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). See Brad Plumer, 
Five Myths About the Solyndra Collapse, WASH. POST WONKBLOG (Sept. 14, 2011 10:07 
AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/post/five-myths-about-the-solyndra-
collapse/2011/09/14/gIQAfkyvRK_blog.html (describing that defenders of the Solyndra 
carrot have pointed to large subsidies from China as a key factor in the company’s failure, 
but others point out that it was the price of silicon, which helped Chinese manufacturers, that 
was the greatest detriment to Solyndra’s non-silicon panels) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). Chinese subsidization of 
industry—its own carrots—is nothing new, of course. Indeed, if one accepts that the goal of 
the Energy Policy Act of 2005 was to avoid greenhouse gas emissions, 42 U.S.C. § 
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once the government in 2009 made Solyndra its “poster child” for clean 
energy carrots, both politics and bureaucratic slowness made a potential 
reversal of course in 2010 and 2011 highly difficult.269 
 In addition to being inherently slow to respond to market changes, 
government carrots are susceptible to failure because they are the product 
of only one participant in the market. Even perceptive private capitalists 
make significant mistakes.270 Consider the example of the Chevy Volt 
electric car. In 2008, as Senator Barack Obama was moving toward the 
presidency, the venerable Atlantic magazine ran a cover story about 
General Motors’ commitment to a new electric car.271 The Volt, which was 
not yet completed because of the complexities of its ground-breaking 
battery, was called an “automobile sensation” that might “reinvent the 
automobile.”272 The Volt was designed to revolutionize the public’s 
perception of General Motors, which for much of the twentieth century was 
the largest corporation in the world but which had been stung by changes in 
the market,273 on which Japanese competitors capitalized.274 The Atlantic 
quoted GM officials as stating that “failure is not an option,” and implying 
that the future of the largest industrial corporation in the United States hung 
                                                                                                                 
16513(a)(1), China’s subsidies should be welcome, in that the Chinese government is paying 
for the United States to be able to buy inexpensive products that can cut emissions more 
cheaply than it otherwise could. This parallels the argument that China’s fostering of exports 
helps Americans consumers by providing them with low-cost goods—although arguably at 
the cost of American manufacturing jobs.   
 269. See House Republican Report, supra note 78, at 141–43 (illustrating that although 
OMB and the White House knew there were financial problems, they continued with the 
program). 
 270. See Technology Policy, supra note 261, at 10 (describing the risks private 
companies such as Macintosh and IBM make when investing and their mistakes).  
 271. See Jonathan Rauch, Electro-Shock Therapy, THE ATLANTIC (Jul./Aug. 2008), 
available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/07/electro-shock-
therapy/306871 [hereinafter Electro-Shock] (describing the road GM took to create the 
Chevrolet Volt). 
 272. See id. (illustrating the positives and negatives of the new automobile). 
 273. In 1953, former GM chief Charles Wilson, at hearings before Congress for his 
nomination to secretary of defense, stated that there would no conflict between his former 
job and his future one because, he said, “for years I thought that what was good for our 
country was good for General Motors, and vice versa.” The quote was often repeated by 
critics as “What’s good for General Motors is good for the country”—supposedly an 
example of a capitalist’s foolishly conflating corporate profits with the national welfare. See 
John Berlau, What’s Good for GM is Now Terrible for America, AM. SPECTATOR (Nov. 18, 
2010, 6:09 AM), http://spectator.org/archives/2010/11/18/whats-good-for-gm-is-now-terri 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
 274. See Electro-Shock, supra note 271 (discussing Toyota’s moves and success 
creating the Prius which put GM on its heels). 
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in the balance.275 When it was introduced for sale two years later, in late 
2010, however, the Chevy Volt hardly made a ripple in the market.276  
 What had happened in the interim was unexpected, of course. The 
global economic recession had sent the once-mighty General Motors into 
insolvency, with its rescue assured only by a colossal infusion of federal 
money and a government-sponsored bankruptcy reorganization that created 
a new corporation, with the federal government as the largest 
stockholder.277 Meanwhile, gas prices, which topped four dollars a gallon in 
2008, had fallen dramatically, diminishing the incentive for highly fuel-
efficient cars.278 At the same time, environmentally oriented Americans 
were flocking to buy the Toyota Prius, a hybrid car that became a great 
success: in 2011, Toyota’s Prius sales were more than 136,000, while GM 
sold only 7,671 Volts.279 In 2012, GM briefly suspended production of the 
Volt.280  
                                                                                                                 
 275. See Electro-Shock, supra note 271 (describing the fragility of the situation while 
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 277. See General Motors, N.Y. TIMES TOPICS (Oct. 31, 2012), 
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Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
 278. See U.S. Energy Info. Agency, U.S. All Grades Conventional Retail Gasoline 
Prices, 
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=EMM_EPM0U_PTE_NUS_
DPG&f=M (last visited Nov. 4, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of 
Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
 279. See Toyota Corp, Toyota Reports December 2011 and Year-End Sales (Jan. 4, 
2012), http://pressroom.toyota.com/releases/toyota+reports+december+2011+year-
end+sales.htm (reporting on Prius sales) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of 
Energy, Climate, and the Environment); David Welch, GM’s Chevy Volt Misses 2011 U.S. 
Sales Goal As Safety Probed, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 4, 2012), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-04/gm-s-chevy-volt-misses-2011-sales-target-as-
safety-probe-goes-on.html (reporting on Volt sales) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
 280. See Charles Lane, Electric Cars and Liberals’ Refusal to Accept Science, WASH. 
POST (Mar. 5, 2012), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/electric-cars-
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 What accounted for the failure of the Volt and the success of the 
Prius? Analysts have cited a variety of factors, including the unique styling 
of the Prius, which is distinctive even from a distance, and its adoption 
during the heyday of Gore-fueled environmental awareness by Hollywood 
celebrities, including Leonardo DiCaprio.281 While a Volt costs somewhat 
less to operate each year, because it uses very little gasoline, it initially 
costs more than $40,000 before a federal tax credit of $7,500, whereas a 
basic Prius, the hybrid engine of which does not need to be plugged in, can 
be purchased for about $27,000.282 The auto tax credit, another example of 
a seemingly minor but expensive carrot, has been called a “snobby” subsidy 
for wealthy environmentalists.283 This is not to say that the Volt will be a 
permanent failure; it is conceivable that gasoline prices will soar to ten 
dollars a gallon later this decade, making the Volt far more attractive.284 
The point of this vignette is that any single organization—be it a corporate 
giant such as General Motors, or the federal Energy Department—is likely 
to make mistakes concerning which projects to award carrots; there are 
simply too many variables, and too many unknown factors, to hand out 
carrots with confidence.285 With the taxpayer’s money at stake, an 
expensive regime of carrots is both dangerous and unwise—especially 
because of the straightforward alternative, to which the Essay makes its 
final turn.286  
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available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/05/business/energy-environment/for-hybrid-
and-electric-cars-to-pay-off-owners-must-wait.html?pagewanted=all. According to Bunkley, 
the gas savings from a Volt would take 27 years to pay off. Id.  
 283. Charles Lane, Unaffordable at Any Speed, SLATE (Jul. 30, 2010), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2010/07/unaffordable_at_any_speed.html 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
 284. See John Broder, The Electric Car, Unplugged, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2012), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/25/sunday-review/the-electric-car-
unplugged.html?pagewanted=all (assessing the gloomy prospects for electric cars). 
 285. See Cumulating Policy, supra note 260, at 537–38, 545 (describing the way 
government intervention disrupts normal market signals and influences corporate survival 
“with little or no apparent economic logic to support their decisions.”); Ending Corporate 
Welfare, supra note 257, at 5 (noting the poor federal track record of picking worthy 
recipients and lack of experience relative to private capital markets). 
 286. See supra notes 244–65 and accompanying text. The number of federal carrots for 
“clean” energy is legion, including the Advanced Biofuel Production Grant and Loan 
Guarantee Program. See 7 U.S.C. § 8103 (2011). Another notable carrot, the hydrogen fuel 
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VI. The Stick and the Invisible Hand  
 
 A well-crafted regulatory stick, in contrast to a carrot, can minimize 
the drawbacks of politicization and inaccuracy. Consider a simple form of a 
legal stick: a tax on greenhouse gas pollution.287 Because of the wide reach 
and evenhandedness of such a tax, the problems of politicization and 
accuracy are largely avoided.288 
 A straightforward tax on greenhouse gases would reach all sources 
of such pollution, from coal-fired power plant smokestacks, to small factory 
pollution, to emissions from the tailpipes of both gas-guzzling cars and the 
Toyota Prius.289 It avoids politicization because it offers few policy 
decisions though which politics can seep: there are no applications, no 
discretionary awards, no negotiations with private investors, few chances 
for entanglements with campaign contributors, and no contracts with 
private parties.290 The variant of a tax, a cap-and-trade regime, holds 
somewhat more chances for politicization, in that it is more complex and 
                                                                                                                 
excise tax credit, provides substantial tax credits for using alcohol fuels, biodiesel mixtures, 
and other alternative fuels. See 26 U.S.C. § 6426 (2011). Likewise, the small ethanol 
producer tax credit provides a similar carrot on the production side. See 26 U.S.C. § 40 
(2011). For state laws, see Financial Incentives for Renewable Energy, DATABASE OF STATE 
INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY, 
http://www.dsireusa.org/summarytables/finre.cfm (last visited Jan. 7, 2013) (summarizing 
credits available in each state) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, 
Climate, and the Environment). 
 287. Taxes used as economic incentives are often called Pigovian taxes in honor of 
Arthur Pigou. See ARTHUR C. PIGOU, ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 28–29 (1950) (“[A]ll taxes 
which differentiate against saving, as compared with spending, must diminish economic 
welfare. . . . Our analysis also suggests that economic welfare could be increased by some 
rightly chosen degree of differentiation in favour of saving.”) (emphasis in original). 
 288. See GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAW 583–85 (Michael Gerrard ed., 2007) 
[hereinafter GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE] (noting that the carbon tax rate could be keyed to 
scientific evidence, while encouraging various appropriate behavioral changes for the variety 
of users affected). 
 289. For explanations of the workings of a tax, see ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE POLITICS 
OF CLIMATE CHANGE 152–53 (2009) [hereinafter POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE] (stating that 
carbon taxes can be broad-based or target a specific polluter, and generally should target the 
sources of pollution rather than taxing the consumption end); ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGULATIONS AND GLOBAL WARMING 123–24 (Paul Ruschmann ed., 2009) [hereinafter 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS] (discussing a tax as an option to attempt to curb global 
warming); GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 288, at 583–85 (describing pollution taxes 
as affording producers maximum flexibility in choosing abatement measures while placing a 
ceiling on costs). 
 290. See POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 289, at 154–56 (noting that while it 
takes “fairly complex” policy strategies to implement simple carbon taxes that do not act 
regressively, in an alternative scheme of carbon rationing, “the role of government would be 
crucial” to conduct constant monitoring and quota-setting). 
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offers more opportunities for politically motivated adjustments.291 The most 
notable cap-and-trade system for greenhouse gases was established through 
the Kyoto Protocol of 1997;292 the United States refused to join largely 
because of the political decision by the parties not to demand greenhouse 
gas reductions from developing nations such as China.293  
 The key advantage of a tax is that all producers and consumers of 
greenhouse gases would be prodded, by the stick, to look constantly for 
ways to avoid paying the tax or to avoid paying as much tax.294 An 
electrical generator would factor into its business plans a switch from 
highly-taxed coal to less-highly-taxed natural gas; if and when solar energy 
becomes more efficient and competitive, the plant might consider a switch 
to this renewable source. 295 If and when hydrogen fuel cells are improved 
so that they are advantageous, parties would be nudged into considering this 
source.296 Another great benefit of a tax is that government does not have to 
be able to make bets about the future—it simply sets in place a regulatory 
mechanism that encourages the development of alternatives to the taxed 
                                                                                                                 
 291. See POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 289, at 198–99 (recounting the 
ineffectiveness of the European Emissions Trading Scheme, caused in large part by political 
lobbying). A cap and trade system allocates allowances to pollute; these allowances then 
may be bought and sold in the market. See GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 288, at 
104 (describing the EU Emissions Trading Scheme). The decisions of how to allocate or sell 
the initial allowances, whether to impose any restrictions on sales, and whether to award 
credits for carbon sinks (mechanisms that remove carbon from the atmosphere) make a cap-
and-system more complex than a tax. See GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 288, at 120 
(posing various questions that must be decided in a cap and trade regime). For these reasons, 
many economists prefer the simplicity of a tax. See GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 
288, at 583–84 (explaining the relative benefits of a straightforward tax, but noting that any 
policy with the word “tax” engenders opposition). 
 292. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
Dec. 10, 1997, 37 ILM 22 (1998). In the United States, the most notable state cap-and-trade 
system is California’s Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY 
CODE §§ 38500–99 (West 2010). 
 293. See Bradford C. Mank, Standing and Global Warming: Is Injury to All Injury to 
None?, 35 ENVTL. L. 1, 18–21 (2005) (explaining the politics involved in the rejection of the 
Kyoto Protocol). 
 294. See THE SCIENCE AND POLITICS OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, 134–36 (Andrew 
Dessler & Edward Parson eds., 2010) [hereinafter SCIENCE AND POLITICS] (“Under a tax, 
every emitter will cut until the marginal cost of the next ton is equal to the tax rate . . . 
beyond that point they would rather pay the tax than make the more expensive cuts available 
to them.”). 
 295. See id. at 127–28 (describing how fuel shifts from coal to natural gas to renewable 
sources would decarbonize energy production over time). 
 296. See GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 288, at 568 (describing the current 
technical limitations of fuel cells and their reliance on coal-fueled electrical generation in the 
U.S). 
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sources of pollution and then lets the market and technology work out 
efficient switches.297 
 Which renewable technology holds the key to the future: solar, 
wind, waves, nuclear, geothermal, hydrogen? With a tax, the choice is not 
made by a politicized, slowly reacting government and its laws, but by the 
forces of a constantly changing and evolving market.298 To quote the 18th-
century Scottish economist Adam Smith, an actor in society is “led by 
an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention . . . . 
By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society 
more effectually than when he really intends to promote it.”299 A tax on 
greenhouse gas emissions would encourage conservation even by skeptics 
of global climate change and even by those who think that recycling is all 
they need to do to save the world.300 
 Technologies that seem auspicious today, but that do not pan out, 
would be cast aside by the cool logic of the market and its invisible hand.301 
                                                                                                                 
 297. See GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 288, at 584 (“[A] carbon tax 
encourages several kinds of appropriate behavioral change . . . whichever is the most cost 
effective for the particular user.”); POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 289, at 153–54 
(explaining the widespread incentives of a tax); SCIENCE AND POLITICS, supra note 294, at 
134 (explaining how all actors in society would be motivated by a tax to look for ways to 
avoid the tax). 
 298. Supra notes 246–47 and accompanying text. 
 299. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS 423 (Edwin Cannan ed., Random House, Inc. 1937). 
 300. See GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 288, at 84 (discussing the attractiveness 
of greenhouse gas taxes for their broad reach, and the fact that a rise in gas prices in 2005 
was sufficient to slow the trend of increasing consumption). How much should a tax on 
carbon emissions cost? This detail is not the subject of this Essay, but economists have 
suggested numbers ranging from $10 per ton of carbon to $55 dollars and beyond. See 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS, supra note 289, at 123 (stating estimates related to carbon 
emissions tax); GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 288, at 152 (citing a 2007 study 
advocating a $55 per metric ton tax). If a low tax initially did not encourage enough 
reduction, the tax could be raised to match the perceived externality, or otherwise “adjusted 
for changing circumstances.” GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 288, at 583. There is no 
doubt that such a tax would cost both American consumers and businesses and that a tax 
would cause an economic slump, at least in the short-term. See SCIENCE AND POLITICS, supra 
note 294, at 149 (citing a range of studies and models suggesting that meaningful emission 
limits could cut GDP in future years by several percentage points). Such a slump could be 
ameliorated by slowly phasing in a tax that grew over time. Cf. SCIENCE AND POLITICS, supra 
note 294, at 184–85 (proposing a phased-in cap and trade system). Weighing the advantages 
of a short-term economic slump against the costs of global climate change is a complex 
economic and political question, of course. 
 301. For an example of this dynamic at work, see Nuclear Energy, N.Y. TIMES TOPICS 
(Oct. 12, 2012), http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/business/energy-environment/atomic-
energy/index.html (describing the history of nuclear energy) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). While nuclear power was seen in 
its early days as “the wave of the future,” high plant construction costs and serious 
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Throughout recent history, many glamorous technological innovations that 
seemed promising in the short run failed in the end, due to changes in taste, 
science, or economics that government planners and corporate strategists 
could not have predicted with any certainty.302 While they once seemed like 
waves of the future, eight-track tape music players, Betamax videotape 
players, and CD-ROM data storage devices have all been sent to the 
dumpster by the forces of the market economy.303 Which renewable energy 
source will prove to be the most effective in combating greenhouse 
emissions, over the next ten or one hundred years? Only the forces of 
market, spurred by a tax, will be able to tell efficiently.  
 Another advantage of a stick is that it spurs movement away from 
all sources of the externality, even when actors do not know that they are 
part of the problem. In the United States, for example, a popular image of 
greenhouse gas emissions might be a pollution-belching factory.304 But in 
the United States more than 32 % of carbon emissions arise from the 
generation of electricity (through power plants that burn fossil fuels) and 
another 32 % from vehicles.305 A tax would encourage consumers to take 
day-to-day steps to conserve household electricity and limit driving, such as 
purchasing smaller homes with less square footage to heat, installing fans 
so that air conditioning is used less in summer, and living closer to work so 
that they drive less.306 Western European households enjoy a similar 
                                                                                                                 
environmental dangers quashed market interest during the 1980s and 1990s, while the 
meltdowns at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station dampened recent resurgent interest 
in the technology as a viable alternative energy source. Id. 
 302. ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS, supra note 289, at 134–35; see POLITICS OF 
CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 289, at 129–38 (criticizing the appealing but faulty allure of a 
single breakthrough technology, such as hydrogen cells).  
 303. See Sam Grobart, Daddy, What Were Compact Disks?, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 
2012), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/31/technology/personaltech/daddy-
what-are-turntables-eight-tracks-and-floppy-disks.html?pagewanted=all (recalling the “dirty 
little skirmishes” in which older technologies were entirely supplanted by modern 
improvements). 
 304. For one such example, see generally ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS, supra note 
289 (displaying such a factory in a cover image). 
 305. Estimated U.S. Carbon Dioxide Emission in 2010: 5632 Million Metric Tons, 
LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATL. LAB., https://flowcharts.llnl.gov/carbon.html (last visited Nov. 
7, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate and the 
Environment). 
 306. Supra note 286 and accompanying text. An advantage of a tax is that actors are not 
forced into making changes; they are merely encouraged. Thus, an American who greatly 
enjoys driving a Ford F-350 truck long distances each day might grudgingly agree to pay the 
high tax, while others will avoid doing so by switching their habits. A tax thus takes into 
account personal preferences in a way that other regulatory techniques do not. Americans 
prefer to be nudged than ordered to do things. See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2011) 
(examining the benefits of legal polices that nudge, and noting that this kind of “libertarian 
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standard of living to those in the United States, yet they pollute 
significantly less in greenhouse gases, largely because they tend to live in 
smaller houses and drive less.307 None of these steps requires any 
breakthrough in new technology.308 The mundane might be more effective 




 It is an extraordinary irony that one of the Obama Administration’s 
first significant steps in the fight against climate change in 2009—the 
award of a carrot to the Solyndra Corporation—morphed into an albatross 
around the neck of the climate change movement and became arguably the 
                                                                                                                 
paternalism” has received bipartisan support in Congress). One complaint about a potential 
carbon tax is that it is regressive, meaning that a low-income household would probably pay 
a much larger percentage of its income for a tax on household electricity than would a rich 
household. See POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 289, at 152–54 (discussing the 
regressivity dilemma). One straightforward way to address this complaint would be to begin 
the tax only when a household’s electricity usage rises above a baseline amount—perhaps 
the amount typically used in a small apartment. This system would work to the advantage of 
poorer people, who tend to live in smaller households, but would still encourage electricity 
conservation across society. See Average Square Footage of U.S. Homes, by Housing 
Characteristics, 2009, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, available at 
http://www.eia.gov/consumption/residential/data/2009/index.cfm?view=characteristics#unde
fined (last visited Nov. 7, 2012) (showing a nearly threefold increase in average square 
footage per housing unit from the lowest to highest household income brackets, with similar 
increases for average heated and cooled square footage). 
 307. The average house size in the United States in 2010 was 2,392 square feet, up 
from 1,740 square feet in 1980. Median and Average Square Feet of Floor Area in New 
Single-Family Houses Completed by Location, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 
http://www.census.gov/const/C25Ann/sftotalmedavgsqft.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2012). By 
comparison, in 2010 a typical house in Germany was only 1,346 square feet, while the 
average home in England was 990 square feet. See Buying a House or Apartment in 
Germany, HOW TO GERMANY, http://www.howtogermany.com/pages/housebuying.html (last 
visited Nov. 5, 2012) (citing privately obtained figures for German homes) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment); U.K. DEP’T FOR 
COMMUNITIES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, ENGLISH HOUSING SURVEY: HOMES REPORT 2010, 
at 15 (2010), available at 
http://www.communities.gov.uk/publications/corporate/statistics/ehs2010homesreport (“The 
average dwelling [in England] had a total usable floor area of 92m2.”). Meanwhile, the 
typical Briton drove about 3,400 miles in 2008-09; the average licensed driver in America, 
in contrast, drove over 14,000 miles. Compare U.K. DEP’T FOR TRANSPORT, AVERAGE 
DISTANCE TRAVELLED BY MODE- REGION AND AREA TYPE: GREAT BRITAIN (2011), available at 
http://assets.dft.gov.uk/statistics/tables/nts9904.xls (last visited Nov. 22, 2012) (providing 
U.K. data) with U.S. FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION, OUR NATION’S HIGHWAYS: 2010, 
at 31, available at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/pubs/hf/pl10023/ (last visited 
Nov. 22, 2012) (providing U.S. data). 
 308. See POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 289, at 158–61 (touting the energy 
efficiency of smaller-scale, better-planned communities employing existing technology). 
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most prominent environmental topic during the 2012 presidential 
election.309 To be sure, a confluence of bad luck and untimely events may 
have contributed to the political debacle.310 Nonetheless, as this Essay has 
endeavored to show, the story illustrates that a policy of awarding carrots in 
the name of environmental protection is inherently susceptible to infection 
by politics and poor market choices.311 Solyndra stands as a powerful 
cautionary tale for both environmentalists and lawmakers. 312 It would 
behoove future environmentally-oriented lawmakers to avoid the allure of 
carrots.313 Only the stick of a tax, or its variant of a cap-and-trade program, 
is likely to be widely effective, while avoiding the risks of a carrot.314 To be 
sure, it is extraordinarily difficult to convince the American public that 
imposing a stick on them is wise policy.315 But if we are serious about using 
law to combat climate change and protect the environment, it is the sensible 
choice. 
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